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ABSTRACT
THE (RAIL)ROAD NOT TRAVELED:
THE FAILURE OF THE KRM COMMUTER RAIL PROPOSAL IN GREATER
MILWAUKEE, WI
by
Neal A. Johnson
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Dr. Linda M. McCarthy
The Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter rail (KRM) proposal was one of many
passenger rail proposals studied for the greater Milwaukee area over the past few
decades. The proposed line would have connected the cities of Kenosha, Racine and
Milwaukee, as well as communities in northern Illinois, along already existing rail lines.
An analysis of archival information, newspaper coverage, and interviews with key
stakeholders were conducted to explore the influence of an auto-dominated culture, the
role of politics, local and regional expectations, funding issues, and the legacy of earlier
local debates to determine why the KRM commuter rail proposal failed. In the beginning,
the KRM proposal garnered overwhelming public and political support and was expected
to drive economic development and regional transit cooperation. However, soon the tone
changed and the KRM proposal was dead before it ever left the station. And while the
failure of the KRM proposal can officially be blamed on conservative political leaders, a
deeper analysis reveals that the KRM proposal's failure can be also be traced to the
personal agendas of political leaders on both side of the aisle. This exploration into why
the KRM commuter rail proposal failed will provide lessons learned for future
Milwaukee proposals and new rail transit proposals throughout the country.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, passenger rail has been the focus of much attention in
greater Milwaukee. Aiming to increase mobility for area residents, the greater Milwaukee
area has seen numerous passenger rail initiatives introduced during this time. Perhaps
most well-known is the East-West Corridor study from the 1990s that looked at the
possibility of light rail for Milwaukee, which has now dwindled down to the current
debate over a 1.9 mile streetcar line in downtown Milwaukee. Similarly, the State of
Wisconsin started work on a proposed high speed rail line that would have connected
Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul through Wisconsin’s two largest cities, Milwaukee and
Madison. There have also been proposals for commuter rail projects such as the KRM
commuter rail line from Kenosha to downtown Milwaukee. However, none of these
proposals have yet to come to fruition.
Within this larger context of passenger rail, I specifically focus on the KRM
commuter rail proposal. The case of KRM is an important study because while the
service would have connected Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha as well as the Greater
Chicago area, it could also be considered part of a larger regional rail system serving
Southeast Wisconsin and Northeast Illinois. Thus it serves more than just the suburban
commuter but the mobility needs of the entire region, connecting communities through an
integrated regional system.
The term commuter rail refers to rush-hour services at the beginning and end of
the day and is commonly seen as a preferred option for bringing suburban commuters
into the central city (Cervero, 1998; Richmond, 2001). More broadly, commuter rail can
also serve shoppers, students, and visitors, which is why it is also sometimes referred to
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as regional rail (Grava, 2003). Commuter rail and regional rail both refer to passenger rail
service that covers a large metropolitan area that is run by self-propelled locomotives,
usually on existing rights-of-way.
This paper looks at the KRM commuter rail proposal to discern the reasons for its
failure. It begins with background on the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning
Commission (SEWRPC) and the KRM proposal, followed by a review of the academic
and public policy literature on passenger rail, research questions, and methodology. The
findings of the paper are in five sections: automobile culture and the KRM; the politics of
KRM; the expectations of KRM; funding issues for KRM; and KRM and the light rail
debate. The paper closes with conclusions, lessons learned, and further research.
Context and Background of Case Study
The Role of the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission
In order to understand the debate about passenger rail in Wisconsin, an
introduction to SEWRPC is necessary. What follows is a brief history and introductory
background of SEWRPC, including how and why the commission was formed and the
function it serves in transportation planning in southeast Wisconsin.
SEWRPC was formed on August 8, 1960 by then-governor Gaylord Nelson
(Casey, 1998). SEWRPC covers seven counties in southeast Wisconsin: Kenosha,
Walworth, Racine, Milwaukee, Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington. At formation, this
area accounted for about 40% of the state's population but only 5% of its land (Hayes,
2010). From the beginning, the issues of unplanned development and changing regional
dynamics were apparent. As Hayes (2010, p.13) described:
The transportation system of streets, roads and highways was hardly a system at
all. Transportation planning was uncoordinated and piecemeal, based as much on
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local political influence as on real needs of motorists. Thus, a major thoroughfare
in Milwaukee might abruptly become a narrow city street as it passed a boundary
into a suburb.
Traffic, especially during rush-hours or winter weather, would often cause gridlock for
entire neighborhoods. SEWRPC also dealt with other issues in the region, but much of its
focus was on development that was sprawling faster than the infrastructure to support it.
The planning process was to be "nonpolitical" and "based on solid planning and
engineering data" (Hayes, 2010, p 19). However, Casey (1998, p. 722) argued that the
law that created SEWRPC was deficient due to the advisory nature of the commission
and its lack of power to implement approved plans. When it came to transportation
planning, Hayes (2010, p. 24) described the guidelines as follows:
An individual highway or transit line cannot be planned in isolation. It must be
recognized that the total urban transportation network acts as a system . . .
Highway and transit systems must be planned together . . . The planning must be
metropolitan or regional in scope . . . Transportation planning cannot be separated
from land use planning.
Overall, SEWRPC was a commission formed to solve the pressing problems of
unplanned development in the region, but was ineffective because it was simply an
advisory board and not an implementing agency. It was still up to local governing bodies
to implement the recommendations of the commission.
KRM Background
The discussion about passenger rail linking Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha
with Northern Illinois and the greater Chicago area has been a topic of debate for
decades. A 1993 study looked at several possible routes, but mainly focused on a highspeed rail connection between Chicago and Milwaukee (Envirodyne Engineers, Inc.,
1993). A 1998 study then gave rise to the idea of commuter rail connecting Milwaukee,
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Racine and Kenosha through the existing Metra system which terminates in Kenosha
(Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission [SEWRPC], 1998).
Metra is a commuter rail system serving the seven county Chicagoland area
(Metra, 2014). The system serves 241 stations, on nearly 490 route miles, and provides
over 80 million passenger trips per year (Metra, 2012). The system is funded through
ticket sales and a sales tax in the Illinois counties served (Metra, 2014). The original
plans were to have Metra extend their current service to Racine and Milwaukee (Ryan,
2005). However, because of Metra's establishment as an Illinois agency, it was unable to
extend service to Milwaukee (Sandler, 2006). In fact, Metra service to Kenosha was paid
for by the Union Pacific railroad because of the ease of turning around trains in the
already existing facility. Thus the KRM proposal was a southeast Wisconsin issue, and a
new agency would be needed to run it. The debate about the proposal continued, and in
2010 the Southeast Regional Transit Authority (SERTA) again asked Metra officials to
extend their current service from Kenosha to Milwaukee, but Metra was not interested in
extending their service and was still limited as an agency of the state of Illinois (Sandler,
2010a).
The Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter rail was a proposed 33 mile
commuter rail system with nine stops planned (see map on following page) including
major stops in Kenosha, Racine, and Milwaukee (Transit NOW, 2012) with an estimated
annual ridership of 1.7 million (Institute for Survey & Policy Research, 2007). The
system would have used existing freight railroad tracks with 14 weekday round trips
planned (Transit NOW, 2012). Weekend service was also proposed at less frequent
intervals. The service was to run on the Union Pacific line near the shore of Lake
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Map of proposed KRM commuter rail route.

Source: Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC). Retrieved from:
http://maps.sewrpc.org/KRMonline/background.shtm

Michigan through Racine and Kenosha. As a Racine Journal Times editorial described,
"KRM would connect a corridor of highly populated areas in the southeastern corner of
the state" (2011). This would place the KRM on a different line than the Amtrak
Hiawatha service that runs from Milwaukee to Chicago on tracks closer to Interstate 94.
The KRM line and Amtrak thus would have served different markets and different
purposes; with KRM connecting areas between Milwaukee and Kenosha, and Amtrak's
Hiawatha service as a quick connection between Milwaukee and Chicago.
A group of business leaders, elected officials, and pro-transit groups met in early
2005 to discuss the advancement of the KRM proposal. As the non-profit transit group,
Transit NOW (n.d.), put it:
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On February 25, 2005 the county executives and mayors of Kenosha, Racine, and
Milwaukee, and WisDOT joined in an act of true regional cooperation when they
sign[ed] an inter-governmental agreement (IGA) that will act as the management
structure for the next steps of the KRM commuter rail Metra extension project.
In July of 2005 a bill was passed by the State Legislature and signed by then-Governor
Jim Doyle establishing a temporary regional transit authority for Kenosha, Racine, and
Milwaukee counties (SEWRPC, 2011a). In early 2006 this board of the newly formed
Regional Transit Authority (RTA) was complete and consisted of one member from each
of the three counties of Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee, one member from the cities of
Kenosha and Racine and two members from the City of Milwaukee (Transit NOW, n.d.).
The legislature further legitimized the Southeast Regional Transit Authority (SERTA) in
the 2009-2011 state budget when it was signed on June 29, 2009, giving them the
authority to manage and fund the KRM (Transit NOW, n.d.).
By July of 2007 an alternatives analysis was completed with the help of SEWRPC
that considered alternatives including buses only, and different combinations of both bus
and rail (SEWRPC, 2011a). The conclusion of the KRM committee was that commuter
rail was the preferred alternative. However, Rubin and Poole (2008) from the Reason
Foundation argued that the alternatives were not given full consideration and further
questioned the economic development forecasts.
Initially, KRM commuter rail "attracted broad support, without the level of
opposition that has hampered light rail and electric bus proposals," according to Larry
Sandler (2003) of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. This support came from all levels of
government with Democratic Governor Jim Doyle making the formation of an RTA (a
requirement for KRM to move forward) one of his policy priorities; Democratic
Congressional Representative Gwen Moore was also supportive by fighting for the
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provision of federal funding for the proposal; Republican Milwaukee County Executive
Scott Walker was supportive of the concept of commuter rail, mainly because of the RTA
concept; at the city level Democratic Racine Mayor John Dickert backed the proposal for
its potential to help the struggling economy in the City of Racine, and Democratic
Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett was supportive of the proposal and positive about the
support from the business community. Further endorsement came from the transit
advocacy group Transit NOW and SEWRPC who worked as staff to SERTA, the agency
who was to fund and operate the commuter rail service. During the public input period in
early 2003, over 1,200 people made favorable comments with only 20 comments
showing opposition (Transit NOW, n.d.). As Transit NOW (n.d.) concluded, "The public
input illustrated resounding support for KRM commuter rail. Those commenting reported
a wide diversity of interest that is uncommonly rare in public projects."
Literature Review
This section begins with a brief discussion of the literature related to commuter
rail and passenger rail to provide context and then critically evaluates the literature which
identifies a number of research questions that need to be asked.
The following attributes of commuter rail explain why it is often chosen as the
way to promote regional transit mobility. First, in many cases commuter rail uses already
established rail alignments and rights of way (Cervero, 1998), using existing resources to
their maximum potential. Second, safety is considerably higher for commuter rail than
automobile travel with a death rate of 0.06 and 0.91 per 100,000,000 passenger miles
respectively (Grava, 2003). Third, commuter rail consumes less energy per passenger if
the cars are mostly full. Last, commuter rail is often associated with increased land values
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in surrounding areas (Cervero and Duncan, 2002) and the potential for transit-oriented
development (Transportation Research Board, 2003).
In contrast, there are some reasons to exercise caution. First, flexibility is greatly
reduced because as population shifts occur the tracks remain fixed in place (Grava,
2003); this is a common criticism of any rail infrastructure. Second, there is also potential
conflict with freight operations, which can slow down commuter service and increase
expenses for infrastructure improvements. Third, local residents may be concerned about
noise from train whistles or the trains themselves. Fourth, rail infrastructure has been
deemed a costly expenditure that has no effect on traffic congestion on local roads or at
job creation (Rubin et al., 1999). And last, despite the best efforts of planners to create
higher-density living, rail transit does not substantially change the broader land use
patterns in the United States (Rubin et al., 1999).
Despite the criticisms, in the past few decades regional rail projects throughout
the United States have been gaining attention as a way to provide increased mobility in
metropolitan regions. Middleton (2003) discussed a "metropolitan railways renaissance"
occurring during the last two decades of the twentieth century in cities such as New York,
Philadelphia, Chicago, Washington D.C., and Portland. Similarly, recent articles
highlighted commuter rail projects in cities such as Fort Worth (Graham, 2013), Houston
(Spieler, 2010), and Portland (Bergman et. al, 2011), and the expansion of already
popular commuter rail service in Chicago (Bowen, 2008). These projects, especially in
places known for freeway building such as Fort Worth and Houston, make it clear that
the study of transit systems is important to understand how this shift in priorities is
occurring and where it is occurring.
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What is missing in this discussion, however, is literature on the failure of
proposed transit systems. While it is important to highlight the success of new regional or
light rail systems and introduce newly proposed systems to the discussion, it is also
crucial to understand why passenger rail systems were not completed. In seeking
resources for this paper, I found minimal acknowledgements of passenger rail proposals
that have failed. I was introduced to one Graduate thesis about the failure of the light rail
proposal in Milwaukee (Lang, 2005). I also found periodical and trade publication
acknowledgements of proposed rail systems that failed in Orlando (Peterson, 2009), the
Netherlands (Railway Gazette International, 2013), New Mexico (Swartz, 2005), and
Australia (Murray, 2010). Academic literature on the failure of passenger rail proposals is
lacking and more research into this aspect of passenger rail, I argue, can help transit
advocates and policy analysts to not only understand the importance of successful rail
transit initiatives, but also learn lessons from the ones that failed despite each proposal
having its own specific context. Studying the failure of passenger rail proposals
specifically provides a more nuanced view of the factors leading to the demise of
passenger rail proposals and can provide further insight into the factors that influence
their failure.
Following this general overview of passenger rail, I now turn to a more critical
review of the literature that will guide my research on the KRM commuter rail proposal.
The literature is divided into five sections corresponding to the five important aspects of
the literature on passenger rail: the impact of the automobile, the role of politics, the
expectations of commuter rail, funding, and the legacy of earlier local debates.
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1. The Impact of the Automobile
Automobile use in the United States has historically far outpaced that of the rest
of the world. The United States was the first country to cross the threshold of mass
motorization in 1958, at 400 vehicles per 1,000 people; nearly fifteen years before
Canada, over twenty years before any European country, and almost thirty years before
Japan (Jones, 2008). By 1980 the U.S. was also the first country to arrive at pervasive
motorization when the combined share of commuting by walking and transit fell below
10%, and the motorization level reached 685 vehicles per 1,000 people. This is an
indication of a society so dominated by the automobile that the level of motorization has
changed the scale of communities and the transportation options found in cities and
metropolitan areas throughout the United States. As Interrante (1983, p. 100) argued
"What began as a vehicle to freedom soon became a necessity."
After World War II, the massive consumption of automobiles and the exodus to
the suburbs via new federally subsidized home loans signaled the downturn for rail in
many parts of the United States (Alvord, 2000). The American people craved suburban
spaces with single-family homes on large lots (Jackson, 1985; McShane, 1994). And as
more Americans were able to finance single-family homes in the suburbs, they were also
able to afford the costs of owning a personal automobile, making it the dominant
transportation mode (Jones, 2008). An unintended consequence of this expansion was the
increased necessity of the automobile due to the design and spatial arrangement of
communities. Infrastructure to aid the mobility of those using the automobile, especially
in urban areas, while initially from state or local funds, eventually came from the federal
government most notably with the 1956 Interstate Highway Act (Jones, 2008).
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The pre-eminence of the automobile in United States transportation has been well
documented (Alvord, 2000; Cervero, 1998; Goddard, 1996; Jackson, 1985, Jones, 2008;
McShane, 1994; Perl, 2002; Richmond, 2001). Consequently, competition by the use of
the automobile is a large hurdle to overcome when attracting ridership for mass transit
(Cervero, 1998; Jones, 2008; Richmond, 2001). As Cameron (1997, p. 67) argued:
In the long run, any reforms that break down the monopoly that the automobile
has on mobility, and that increase the diversity of mobility options available, is
desirable from an equity and an efficiency standpoint. By eliminating implicit
subsidies to the car, efficiency policies have the potential to level the playing field
whereby higher-occupancy modes can compete. These modes should not only
cost less than the single-occupant car, but they should also result in reduced
environmental harm, reduced congestion, and reduced need for costly road
expansions that devastate human and wild habitats alike.
Cervero (1998, p. xi) contended that the explanation for the struggle of transit
"lies in the fact that its chief competitor - the private automobile - is often grossly
underpriced." He showed how large-scale metropolitan railways worked in wealthy
Stockholm, Sweden and auto-centric Munich, Germany because of the differences in
economic policies regarding the automobile. As Jackson (1985) argued United States
governmental policies subsidized not only the building of highways, but also the
expansion of growth into undeveloped land outside the city. As a result, the costs of
owning and operating a personal automobile in the United States are extremely low in
comparison to Europe and other places throughout the world (Jackson, 1985;
Transportation Research Board, 2001). In Europe, higher taxes on fuel and ownership as
well as restrictive parking policies discourage the private automobile for transportation,
while encouraging the use of public transportation. The Transportation Research Board
(2001, p. 118) also described how:
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Throughout much of the post World War II period, the array of consumer choices
available to Western Europeans was limited, not only because of public policies,
but also because of economic conditions. Few Western Europeans had sufficient
income to buy their own home, much less a single-family house on a large lot
outside the city.
This brings into question the role of the federal government in transportation.
While the U.S Department of Transportation (2005) argued that its focus is on
"transportation issues of national significance" this broad statement does not clearly
define the federal government's role in transportation. As the Bipartisan Policy Center
(2011, p. 9) argued, "the federal surface transportation program has not had a focused
purpose or defined objectives since the completion of the Interstate Highway System."
And perhaps it is this ambiguity of new goals and the legacy of past objectives that has
left transit in a subservient role to highways in the eyes of the federal government.
While this literature discusses the history of the automobile in the United States
and explains the transportation reality in most of its metropolitan areas, it does not
adequately explore the individual level transportation choices made by people in their
everyday lives. Blainey et al. (2012) explore this phenomenon enumerating 37 barriers to
choosing passenger rail over other modes of transportation. Now, despite the fact that this
study took place in the United Kingdom and the fact that my study does not focus on
individual transportation choices, this study is important to understanding the larger
context of automobile dominance. Most pertinent to this discussion was their examination
of car dependence. In the article they discussed two forms of car dependence; structural
and conscious. Structural car dependence refers to the lack of transportation alternatives
available to allow for a mode shift away from the personal automobile, while conscious
car dependence is the result of personal habits and inaccurate perceptions of alternatives.
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The authors concluded that, despite all of the variables to mode choice, conscious
car dependence was one of the factors of highest importance and most easy to change.
However, what the author's do not discuss is unconscious car dependence where people
do not even realize their intense level of dependence on the automobile, posing a large
obstacle to the success of passenger rail and other modes. As such exploring the impact
of the automobile on transit projects is important for understanding the larger cultural,
structural, and governmental forces at play.
2. The Role of Politics
Large cities in the United States have been losing population since 1960 due to
suburbanization, changing the political power dynamics at the state level (Weir et al.,
2005). In many cases the political power previously held by a state's largest city quickly
eroded as these cities lost as much as 15% of their 1960 population by 2000 (Weir et al.,
2005). This meant less political clout at the state level at a time when infrastructure needs
began to increase, especially for transportation.
Weir et al. (2005) discussed the three traditional structures of governmental
coalitions to explain the complex political relationships found in the United States: partyimposed coalitions, issue-based coalitions, and governor-brokered coalitions. These
coalitions are crucially important to advancing transportation agendas. Party-imposed
coalitions form when the leading constituency from the city (typically Democratic)
merges with party allies at the state legislative level to push for the agenda of the city.
This type of coalition works to advance a local transportation proposal within regional or
state-wide transportation goals. Issue-based coalitions form around issues of mutual
interest and attempt to garner regional cooperation to solve communal problems. This
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type of coalition looks at larger regional transportation proposals, finding a way to solve
problems at a broader level. Governor-brokered coalitions are typically very broad and
complex constituencies with members from both sides of the aisle working together on
larger issues. Here a governor merges divergent interests to fit into a larger transportation
agenda.
Weir et al. (2005) see these distinct coalition groups as the basis for understanding
how coalition building has typically worked in metropolitan America, but argued that
these traditional forms of coalition building are often caught up in the larger issue of city
versus suburbs. Thus the authors' introduced a new type of coalition, one that merges city
and suburban interests as the solution to creating a regional agenda. While this may be
the ideal way to move regional proposals (such as commuter rail) forward, the
implementation of a regional political coalition is difficult at best. Whether these types of
city-suburban coalitions will be able to emerge as the new model of governmental
coalitions is questionable.
Throughout the 1960s and 70s coalitions of transit advocates found far-reaching
support from a variety of areas including businesses and suburban commuters (Altshuler
and Luberoff, 2003). Cities fought for "their share" of federal transit funds (O'Toole,
2007, p. 196), citing transit lines not necessarily to ease the mobility of residents, but to
fulfill political agendas (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). As Altshuler, a former
Massachusetts secretary of transportation, argued "transit proved to be a policy for all
perspectives on the urban problem. Though its direct constituency was relatively small,
its ideological appeal proved to be extremely broad" (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, p.
187). Powerful coalitions of transit advocates, developers and central city interest groups
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used their political influence to push for rail projects (O'Toole, 2007). And while support
from the downtown business sector and the political sector is important for the success of
passenger rail (Levinson et al., 2012), this can be difficult in light of more contemporary
assessments that describe transit proposals as politically divisive with support from
Democrats but opposition from Republicans (Schwartz and Hawkins, 2013).
There is also the neoliberal shift in governance that has dominated since the late
1970s (Harvey, 2007; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Theodore, Peck and Brenner, 2011).
Neoliberalism tends to focus on privatization, open markets, reduced public sector
presence, and less federal power, and is often seen as a response to the Keynesian
policies of governmental intervention, regulation of the private sector, and federallyfunded public works programs that preceded it. In my assessment, the dominance of
neoliberalism has constrained transit in the United States as public infrastructure
investments have been devolved to the local level and the federal government embraces a
more entrepreneurial approach.
Historian Owen Gutfreund (2004) suggested that the construction of highways in
the United States was fueled by powerful highway lobbying groups that embedded the
government bankroll of auto-centric planning into the core of American civilization. He
traced these lobbying groups as far back as the late nineteenth century, and noted their
increased influence in the passage of federal highway legislation in the early twentieth
century. As Gutfreund argued, these groups established “the insertion of auto subsidies
into the fabric of American political culture” (p. 32). Then the highway lobby gained an
ally in the White House with the 1952 election of Dwight Eisenhower, and the Interstate
Highway Act was passed in 1956 (Altshulter and Luberoff, 2003). Today the highway
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lobby typically aligns with Republican leaders that continue to defend the implicit
subsidizing of highways (Ross, 2006).
The Transportation Research Board (2001) suggested that regional governmental
control of land use and transportation would help alleviate many of the issues facing the
United States' metropolitan areas. In many cases individual municipalities are in charge
of their own land use policies and transportation policy is often separated from land use
and controlled by another local or regional authority.
The Portland, Oregon region serves as an example of an urban area where land
use and transportation planning decisions are made at a regional level and coordinated
into a broader plan (Transportation Research Board, 2001). This case suggests that when
all of the stakeholders in the region join together to plan a coordinated land
use/transportation plan, there are benefits for all involved. But politics often gets in the
way of sound planning and cooperation, a product of the United States' politically
fragmented governmental structure (Transportation Research Board, 2001). O'Toole
(2007) argued that combining land use and transportation planning allowed for planners
to manipulate land uses to serve their own agenda of getting people out of their cars.
While I think this may have been the overall goal, O'Toole would have you believe this
was a way to "socially engineer" (p. 196) Americans, instead of simply providing an
alternative to an auto-centric lifestyle.
Overall, politics plays an important role in the fate of passenger rail. Regional
political dynamics have now shifted power away from large cities as suburban districts
put forth their own competing agendas. Governmental coalitions and regional
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cooperation are very important to this discussion and provide a framework for
understanding how these complex political relationships are formed.
3. Local and Regional Expectations of Commuter Rail
Planners often tout the expected economic development potential in the vicinity
of rail lines and at rail station locations. As the Transportation Research Board (2003, 171) discussed, "transit-oriented development (TOD) generally refers to higher-density
development, with pedestrian priority, located within easy walking distance of a major
public transit station or stop(s)." These projects provide the potential for increased
pedestrian activity seen as a way to curb urban sprawl and increase transit use
(Transportation Research Board, 2003). This type of development conforms to designs
often described as "new urbanism." Increased pedestrian activity, transit use, and denser
development are some of the key tenets of the "new urbanist" movement. Similarly, the
key objectives of transit-oriented developments are (Transportation Research Board,
2003, p. 17-2):


To create places for people to live their daily lives through the use of transit and
not the automobile.



To introduce new riders to transit, especially those who currently drive.



To build transit stations that serve as points of interest rather than park-and-rides.



To respond to the auto-oriented elements of other developments.



To emphasize environmental sustainability.
The type and amount of transit-oriented development that occurs can look very

different, even on the same transit system. As the following examples from the
Washington D.C. Metro system show, it is important to understand and work within the
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local context when planning transit-oriented developments. In the example of the Wiehle
Avenue station in Fairfax, VA some planners envisioned a "mini-city" rising from the
station platform; however this type of development would be out of context with the
surrounding land use patterns (Transportation Research Board, 2001). Others saw a more
pedestrian friendly "town center" with upscale shops and inviting public spaces,
something more in keeping with the local context. Whichever option was chosen,
however, would still have to address the broader issue of land use patterns throughout the
area to really have an impact on ridership.
The example of the Gallery Place station in historic downtown Washington D.C.
showed how transit-oriented development has the potential to pay off with large increases
in ridership and economic development (Transportation Research Board, 2003). Here the
local central-city context can make it easier for ridership increases to happen since the
development is part of a local land use pattern with increased density and pedestrian
amenities. What is unknown in this scenario is if the increases in ridership would have
come without the investments in transit-oriented development, something that is often
questioned in these scenarios. The local conditions in suburban Fairfax, VA and in urban
Washington D.C. are very different, so it is important that the local context be considered
since the success of transit-oriented developments is also affected by surrounding land
use patterns.
O'Toole (2009), a vocal critic of transit-oriented development, argued that rail
transit, due to its inherit inflexibility, needed to create its own ridership; arguing that the
fixed nature of rail does not allow for route flexibility to follow development and
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ridership, so new development is needed near rail stations to spur ridership. He continued
his argument by saying:
This leads transit agencies to promote intrusive land-use regulation that
discourages low-density development away from their rail lines and mandates
and/or subsidizes high-density developments close to rail stations (O'Toole, 2009,
p. 67).
What O'Toole does not consider, however, is that new development not planned around
transit is typically not amenable to buses or other forms of "flexible" transit, and that
higher density development near rail stations may simply be a reflection of higher land
values near the station because of rail, hence making low-density development an uneconomic use of the land.
Sometimes these developments do attract residents, businesses and increased
ridership, but Cervero (2006) concluded that this was largely a reflection of a lifestyle
preference for those choosing to locate there and not part of a larger shift in American
priorities or preferences. Much of it comes down to personal preferences something that
cannot be changed overnight.
A regional transit authority (RTA) is one of the most important elements of a
broader approach to mobility. What follows are two examples of RTA's that formed in
different time periods, under different funding mechanisms, and in different regional
contexts, but each provides a deeper understanding of the expectation of RTA formation
and the implications for regional transit cooperation.
The example of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) is
unique because of the time period in which it was formed and the issues it faced in the
formation process (Golembiewsi & Kiepper, 1976). MARTA was originally conceived as
an inter-governmental partnership between the five counties encompassing the Atlanta
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metro area; Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, Gwinnett, and Clayton (Bullard et al., 2000). When it
was finally formed in 1971, Fulton and DeKalb counties were the only counties that
passed the 1% tax referendum to fund MARTA, so the provision of service was revised
(MARTA, 2004). The fact that only two counties were now part of the RTA is significant
in that some observers may have seen this as a victory, while others may have seen it as a
loss due to the surrounding counties choosing not to be part of the system. As
Golembiewski and Kiepper (1976, 46) argued, MARTA had the expectation to build,
operate and fund a mass transit system of rail lines and buses for the whole region. This
may have been too much to expect from MARTA, as opposed to the Bay Area Rapid
Transit (BART) in the San Francisco Bay Area that was only responsible for the regional
rail components (Golembiewski & Kiepper, 1976).
The example of the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA)
provides an example of regional transit cooperation that was accomplished by careful
negotiations between the three counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
(Alpert et al., 2006). In the case of south Florida, there were many provisions put into the
legislation that helped to protect county-level financial autonomy and yet still form a
regional transit structure. Counties were each required to put in a certain amount of
money to fund the regional rail system and local funding mechanisms, such as the transit
sales tax in Miami-Dade County, could go to local projects within the County instead of
to the larger RTA. So the south Florida RTA makes an interesting case, because of its
unique funding mechanisms that allow for local control of financial resources and
separate funding for the RTA.
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While the cooperation of an entire metro region on transit may be the ultimate
goal, these examples show that different approaches to a regional transit structure are
possible. It may be too much to expect complete cooperation under one regional entity, so
perhaps these examples can serve as a framework for regional cooperation where
traditional approaches have not been successful.
The easiest way to understand the complex relationships involved in regional
transit coordination is by using Ulberg's (cited in Meligrana, 1999) models of
transportation governance. His levels of regional cooperation include: complete
independence, informal coordination, formal coordination, partial integration, and full
integration. However, this categorization is not rigid and many regions fall somewhere
between categories. What this hierarchy shows is that while complete independence is
not a regional approach and full integration may be the ultimate goal, there are varying
degrees of coordination and integration of transit between these extremes that are specific
to each region. Regional transit cooperation and integration is not a one size fits all
concept, and must be looked at in respect to the local context. This hierarchy of
coordination levels helps to contextualize the degree of coordination in a region and the
resulting implications.
As I have shown, transit-oriented developments have the potential to bring
increased economic development to station locations, but may only be a redistribution of
investment in the region. These developments may bring increased ridership but again it
may simply be a reflection of lifestyle choices for those that live or shop there. This leads
me to questions about the expected benefits of economic development and transitoriented development and whether these expected benefits may be an unrealistic
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expectation. Additionally, the prospects for the creation of an RTA are significant when it
comes to large regional rail projects. In those areas without an existing regional transit
authority, these larger rail projects bring this issue to the forefront of debates and the
examples of MARTA and SFRTA show how these approaches can change over time and
vary in scope. Ulberg's models of transportation governance provide a way to better
understand the levels of transit coordination and how different regions and different
RTA's fit into this hierarchy.
4. Local, State and Federal Funding Issues
Transportation funding further complicates the issue of regional rail transit. In the
United States federal and state funds make up a large percentage of the financing for
transit projects. However, in most cases, some local financing is required. There are
many ways in which this can occur such as fuel taxes, parking fees, motor vehicle
registration fees, tolls, property taxes, and sales taxes (Institute of Public Administration,
1979). Support for these additional fees can be mixed. Lowe (2013) discussed how the
federal share for the financing of transit projects, while growing, has been outpaced by
local funding sources. A September 2011 Railway Age article discussed how several
passenger rail projects throughout the United States now depend on local revenue sources
as cities are committing to passenger rail transit, despite needing to cover the costs
themselves (Bowen, 2011). This move is evidence that cities (and regions) really do see
the value of passenger rail for their communities.
This is indicative of the neoliberal shift in governance described earlier, devolving
more financial responsibility for transit to the local level. Despite the provisions for
flexible use of funding introduced in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
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Act of 1991 (ISTEA), and subsequent authorizations, allowing states to use federal funds
for highways or transit (Smart Growth America, 2014), the funds for highways cover as
much as 80-90% of infrastructure costs while transit funds only cover about 50% of
infrastructure costs (Pantell, 2009). This set-up not only subsidizes highway building but
leaves state and local funds to cover a larger gap for transit projects.
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) illustrate how transit funding has changed since the
mid-twentieth century. Fares accounted for up to 91% of revenue in the 1950s and
dropped to 25% by the 1990s, with state and local funding as low as 9% in the 1950s and
peaking at 58% in the 1990s. As Altshuler (1979, p. 31) argued "throughout the 1950s,
when the interstate highway program was getting underway, the conventional wisdom
was that all transit costs, capital as well as operating, should be financed by users."
Federal assistance for rail transit did come with the Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964, but after the 1980s federal money to maintain and operate transit systems fell
dramatically, concentrating instead on capital for new projects (Alshuler and Luberoff,
2003, p. 185-186). This meant that more local funding needed to be provided for the
operation of transit, part of the devolution of neoliberalism leaving state and local
authorities to pay for services previously funded at the federal level.
The Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) "New Starts" program is the current
capital program for "fixed guideway" transit projects throughout the United States (Lowe,
2013). However, the funding through this program is only available on a competitive
basis, requires a local funding source to cover a percentage of the costs, and cannot be
used to fund operations. So while it allows cities without already existing infrastructure to
build passenger rail and other fixed guideway systems, it still has several limitations.
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The New Starts process consists of a series of stages which local agencies, such as
transit system operators or regional planning commissions, must apply for on a
competitive basis (Lowe, 2013). Once systems planning and alternatives analysis are
completed, as part of the process, a project moves to preliminary engineering and final
design. If these stages are successful the project goes into a pipeline where it is rated
against other projects using criteria including cost versus benefit. Lowe (2013) also
suggested that the stability of local financing can affect the decision to receive federal
funds.
This literature shows how over the past 60 years transit funding has changed
dramatically at the local, state and federal levels. Much of this responsibility has been
devolved to the local level as federal commitment to transit has largely shifted to capital
for construction of new projects and not for the operation of transit systems.
5. The Legacy of Earlier Local Debates
Passenger rail initiatives in the Milwaukee area have a long history of ideological
polarization (Casey, 1995; Hayes, 2010; Johnson, 2014; Lang, 2005). As Hayes (2010, p.
171) argued, "No single issue in Southeastern Wisconsin . . . revealed regional divisions
more than transit." Casey (1995) traced the beginnings of these feuds in southeast
Wisconsin to the freeway-building era of the 1960s with then-Milwaukee mayor Henry
Maier coming out against freeways while surrounding counties supported freeway
building for ease of mobility. This sentiment is similar to what I found in my own study
into the light rail debate of the 1990s with then-Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist being
anti-freeway and pro-light rail, while the surrounding counties wanted expanded
freeways but opposed the provision of light rail (Johnson, 2014).
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During the light rail debate these divisions became more than just regional; they
were now politically partisan, pitting conservatives against liberals in a debate that was
hardly ever in the interest of mobility for the citizens of southeast Wisconsin (Hayes,
2010; Lang, 2005). According to Hayes (2010), political divisiveness took on a more
prominent role in 2002 when Republican Scott Walker, then a member of the state
assembly, ran for Milwaukee County Executive as a staunch opponent to any form of rail
transit.
Planners and transit advocates started to explore the use of light rail in Milwaukee
in the 1980s, but these proposals never got very far (Lang, 2005). The issue of light rail
was revived when the Federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)
was signed into law in 1991 (Johnson 2014). As part of the bill, states would receive
Interstate Cost Estimate (ICE) funds from the federal government to complete sections of
interstate highway, but the money could also be diverted to other modes such as transit
and bike infrastructure. Wisconsin received $241 million in ICE funds, thrusting the
debate over light rail back on the table. The political scuffle over light rail in Milwaukee
would continue until 1999 when a compromise was reached whereby light rail was
scrapped from the plans and the money diverted to highway and bridge projects, plus a
small rail transit project in the City of Milwaukee which would get $91.5 million of the
federal funds. This compromise at the end of the debate set a precedent for the
transportation priorities in southeast Wisconsin. The Milwaukee transit project would be
fought over for another decade to come (Hayes, 2010; Johnson, 2014). In 2009,
Congress, through a measure included in President Obama's first budget bill, split the
money with 60% going to the City of Milwaukee for their streetcar project and 40%
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going to Milwaukee County for express bus routes on the Milwaukee County Transit
System (MCTS) (Hayes, 2010).
As the preceding literature shows, the politics of passenger rail transit in southeast
Wisconsin has been ideologically divisive. The legacy of the regional and political
scuffles over transportation options and priorities continues to plague southeast
Wisconsin as the mobility of area residents is determined by the power of political
figures, and not the transportation needs of the people.
Research Questions
The preceding literature review raises the following questions about why the
KRM proposal failed which will guide my research, specifically:
1. What was the influence of the automobile?


What was the impact of an auto-dominated culture on the proposal?

2. What was the role of politics?


How did politics influence the failure of the KRM proposal?



Was coalition-building part of the KRM proposal?



What were the obstacles to regional cooperation in the case of KRM?

3. What were the expectations of KRM and were they too high?


What could KRM's potential impact have been on Milwaukee, Racine and
Kenosha in terms of economic development, transit-oriented development,
and regional transit cooperation?

4. How was the issue of funding addressed?


What were the potential sources of funding especially at federal and local
levels?



How much of KRM's expenses would be covered by fares and what would
this mean for local funding?
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What was the discourse on funding?



Were funding issues responsible for the failure of the KRM proposal?

5. What was the impact of the previous light-rail debate on the KRM?


How did the legacy of regional disagreements over transportation affect
the KRM?

Methodology
The research uses a variety of primary and secondary sources. These sources
include print publications and the online archives of the Southeastern Wisconsin
Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC), and information from Transit NOW's
website, a local public transit advocacy organization. In addition, I analyzed newspaper
coverage of the issue in local and regional publications such as the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, Daily Reporter, Racine Journal Times and Biz Times Milwaukee. Finally, three
in-person interviews were conducted with key stakeholders intimately involved in the
KRM commuter rail proposal.
My first interview was with a public policy analyst that has researched and
written about transportation issues in Milwaukee as well as other cities in the United
States. My second interview was with a transportation planner that was involved in the
KRM proposal. My third interview was with a transit advocate that worked on the
promotion of the KRM.
All interviews were conducted in a private, one-on-one format and were recorded
and transcribed. The interview questions (see Appendix B) were specifically formulated
to elicit answers to the five research questions from each of the interviewees. All of the
interviews were semi-structured to allow the interviewee to expand upon issues they felt
were important, however, each interviewee was asked the same questions. Interviewee
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information has been kept confidential so generic job titles were assigned solely as a way
to distinguish them.
All of the newspaper, website, and archival data was analyzed by hand and
categorized based on answering one of the research questions:
1. What was the influence of the automobile?
2. What was the role of politics?
3. What were the expectations of KRM and were they too high?
4. How was the issue of funding addressed?
5. What was the impact of the previous light-rail debate on the KRM?
All of the content relating to each research question was then transcribed into a separate
document and subdivided into sections of related content. These subsections were
determined after an analysis of the content to find the key factors that relate to answering
each research question based on the number of sources discussing similar ideas, how the
content ties-in with the literature, and how it helped to answer that specific research
question.
Interview data was analyzed and categorized in the same manner, but separate
from the other content. A more integrated approach to analyzing all of the content
together was not used in this case because interviews were conducted after the initial
analysis of newspaper, website, and archival data which allowed for the literature and
other data to guide the interviews. The three interview transcripts were analyzed for
content related to the subsections of content described above using the same criteria. The
interview analysis was used to substantiate and provide deeper understanding of the other
sources, while also providing new insights. The comprehensive analysis that follows
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incorporates all content, subdivided by the key factors found throughout the analysis that
provide an answer to each research question.
Findings and Analysis
1. Automobile Culture and the KRM
This section addresses the question of what the impact of an auto-dominated
culture was on the failure of the KRM proposal. My analysis found that the impact of an
auto-dominated culture on the failure of the KRM proposal can be traced to three
important factors: the integrated nature of the automobile into the southeastern Wisconsin
culture and economy, the level of highway congestion found in the region, and the
inherent bias in favor of highways over transit.
The "mass motorization" and "pervasive motorization" of the United States along
with increased suburbanization in the post-World War II period, discussed previously, are
key macro-level forces influencing automobile proliferation throughout the United States.
However, at the micro-level the impact of the automobile in southeastern Wisconsin can
also be attributed to the area being a dominant hub of auto-related manufacturing during
the American industrial age. The area was home to important auto manufactures like
American Motors and Nash Motors, and auto-related businesses like AC Spark Plug and
Johnson Controls (Hayes, 2010, p. 80). In addition to these are related industries like
Mercury Marine, Briggs and Stratton, Harley-Davidson, and manufacturers of other
motorized equipment like Allis Chalmers and J.I. Case (Hayes, 2010, p. 80). This large
presence of manufacturing devoted to the internal combustion engine made the
automobile an integrated part of the culture and economy of the region.
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The KRM proposal was planned within the context of this automobile culture, one
consequence of which were the obstacles to attracting ridership when compared to the
flexibility of the automobile. Planners and SEWRPC knew that for KRM commuter rail
to be a viable alternative to the automobile, travel times had to be competitive (SEWRPC,
2011b). The KRM proposal estimates showed travel times equal to or better than those of
driving (Transit NOW, 2012). The transportation planner interviewed during my research
acknowledged that the vast majority of people in southeast Wisconsin drive to work or
other destinations and attributed this to the lack of alternatives available here, leaving
many people without a choice. This highlights the structural car dependence, as
introduced by Blainey et al. (2012), seen in southeast Wisconsin where many people
depend on their cars due to structural transportation barriers. In addition, the
aforementioned transportation planner discussed the debates about transit service within
the region; indicating that some people said public transit options were not available
because there was no demand for them, while others said that if there were better
alternatives to the automobile the demand would follow.
As Rosemary Potter, executive director of Transit NOW discussed, the key is to
get people into the habit of using commuter rail, such as during the forecasted
reconstruction of Interstate 94 (Grundle, 2006). This is connected to the idea of conscious
car dependence as described earlier by Blainey et al. (2012), where people are
consciously (but habitually) attached to the automobile and the key to sparking change is
to change people's habits during construction or other major events. Along with this
notion of conscious car dependence, I argue that there is also a dimension of unconscious
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car dependence, especially here in southeast Wisconsin, where people are completely
unaware of their dependence on the automobile.
The automobile culture in southeast Wisconsin seems to also be influenced by the
lack of appreciation for transit. As discussed in my interview with the transit advocate,
there really isn't a broad understanding of what transit (more specifically rail transit) can
do for a region largely because the people of southeast Wisconsin don't travel to the great
transit cities of the country (or the world) and therefore don't appreciate it. This speaks to
how the culture of the region has influenced the transportation options available.
There are differing opinions about the congestion levels in southeast Wisconsin,
which may come down to an issue of relativity. Transit NOW argued that the study area
suffers from traffic congestion and delays that have cost residents and businesses over
$400 million and that the implementation of KRM commuter rail could reduce
congestion and overall traffic volumes in the area (Transit NOW, 2012). However, the
public policy analyst I interviewed saw the levels of congestion in Milwaukee as low
enough that many people do not see a need for alternatives to the automobile. The
transportation planner provided yet another opinion indicating that congestion in
southeast Wisconsin is comparable to other cities of similar size, noting that it is
important to keep in mind the amount of congestion compared to the size of the city.
Transit NOW's argument about the high level of congestion is evidence of the
automobile culture in the area with the discourse surrounding the proposal tailored to
automobile owners. Even though congestion levels may not be as high as in other cities,
this argument gave drivers, especially those that are consciously or unconsciously car
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dependent, a reason to support KRM. However, there is no evidence that these arguments
about KRM reducing congestion in the region resonated with the people.
An analysis of the numbers reveals an inherit bias towards the automobile and
highways in Wisconsin transportation planning. An estimated $1.9 billion is going
towards the rebuilding and widening of Interstate 94 between the Wisconsin/Illinois
border and Milwaukee, while the KRM commuter rail would have cost $230 million for
construction, 12% of the cost of the freeway (Sandler, 2007). While the need for the
reconstruction of the aging highway should not be minimalized, the additional costs of
expansion could have arguably gone to the KRM proposal which could have diverted
people to the use of commuter rail over driving. As Ward Lyles of the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel said of then-Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker, "Walker's vision for the
future is clear: cars and cars only, never mind the costs" (Lyles, 2007).
Even with the flexibility of federal funding, described earlier, which could go to
transit instead of highways, there is still an implicit subsidy to highway projects that
receive a larger percentage of their funding from federal funds, leaving many states, like
Wisconsin, to prioritize highways over transit. Additionally, there is an ambiguity of the
federal role in transportation; where past objectives, such as the Interstate Highway
System, mean the prioritization of highways to serve mobility needs to the neglect of
transit infrastructure.
As the following opinion piece from the February 9, 2007 Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel on the KRM proposal shows, local residents were also frustrated with this issue:
Even though it may not serve everyone directly, it will serve everyone indirectly
by taking hundreds of cars off the roads. In the 1950s, the car and oil companies,
along with their friends in the U.S. government, conspired to build our U.S.
Interstate Highway System, encouraging the massive use of new cars and use of
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fuel to power them . . . closed down many public transportation companies, giving
our citizens no choice but to buy and run their new cars on these new
superhighways. The state of Wisconsin and federal government are now planning
to widen sections of I-94 between Milwaukee and Chicago to accommodate
hundreds of additional cars over time (Myers, 2007).
This critique of car manufacturers, oil companies, and the government in the proliferation
of the automobile in the United States and southeast Wisconsin shows the extent to which
this inherit bias towards highways over transit has affected southeast Wisconsin culture.
While the use of the word "conspired" might be a bit strong, it is hard to refute the
influence of the Interstate Highway System on the demise of transit that has left many
American's with little choice but to own and operate a private automobile.
As my analysis has shown, the evidence for an auto-dominated culture in
southeastern Wisconsin is clear. The automobile is an integrated part of the southeastern
Wisconsin culture and economy; this can be seen in the concentration of automobilerelated industries, the way the proposal was planned and disseminated to the public, the
car dependency of the public, and a lack of appreciation and understanding for what
transit can mean to a community. The levels of traffic congestion in the region seem to be
different depending on whom you ask; while traffic congestion was used as a selling tool
by some, this argument did not resonate with the people and left many wondering if the
service was necessary. The inherit bias towards highways over transit is easily seen in the
numbers, something local officials never seemed to question but a fact that upset some
residents.
Despite the influence of the automobile on the KRM proposal and the evidence
for an auto-dominated culture in southeast Wisconsin, my analysis revealed that other
factors were in fact more influential in the demise of the KRM proposal. As further
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analysis will reveal, the proposal was still able to move forward and might have even
happened despite the influence of an auto-dominated culture.
2. Politics of KRM
My analysis revealed that the role of politics in the failure of the KRM proposal
can be traced to five key factors: a change in general political tone and support, the
formation of SERTA, the lack of support from Milwaukee leaders, the 2010 Governor's
race, and the decisions of three key political figures.
The political tone was positive in early 2005 after the formation of an
"intergovernmental partnership" to begin studying the KRM commuter rail proposal
(Ryan, 2005; SEWRPC, 2011a). However, the debate would soon turn contentious as
described in this March 22, 2007 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article:
It's time to end the Milwaukee transportation wars . . . The dispute over funding to
modernize southeastern Wisconsin's aging transportation system seems likely to
surpass the Hatfield-McCoy feud in intensity and longevity . . . It seems as if
present-day partisans have inherited their positions rather than truly understanding
why they are fighting. The current clash over transportation spending has more do
to with the personal agendas of politicians than the culture wars between suburban
and urban lifestyles that started the feud. Unfortunately, as long as transit
improvements are held hostage in that war, the region's businesses and residents
will suffer greatly (Lyles, 2007).
This account shows that the lines had been drawn in a political war on transit in southeast
Wisconsin, with debates now focused more on ideologies and less on the particular issues
surrounding transit.
Along with this shift in political tone, was a shift in the support of political leaders
on both sides of the aisle. While all of my interviewees discussed how early on in the
debate over KRM there was actually a great deal of Republican support (or at least not
staunch opposition) that eventually changed to opposition, my analysis also revealed a
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change in support by Democratic leaders. Four political figures that I will expand upon
later in this analysis, two Democrats and two Republicans, changed or altered their stance
on the KRM proposal. Democrats Tom Barrett and Gwen Moore, while in support of the
proposal in the beginning had changed their stance as concerns over funding became
apparent. Republicans Scott Walker and Robin Vos, while vocal opponents of the
proposal in the end, they were not always opposed to the proposal. For reasons that will
be revealed throughout this analysis, these political leaders changed their position on, and
subsequently the trajectory of, the KRM proposal.
I saw evidence of this shift in political support as far back as 2004 when it became
clear that funding for the operations of the project would not be coming from the State of
Wisconsin, but from local sources (Sandler, 2004). As a 2006 Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel article showed, when it came to approval of local funding there was a great deal
of support for the KRM in principle but not in practice (Resler, 2006). Then in early 2007
the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee released an economic impact study of the KRM
proposal that boasted of job creation, expanded tourism, increased property values, and
increased economic development that would come from the KRM (Institute for Survey &
Policy Research, 2007). However, Rubin and Poole (2008) of the Reason Foundation, a
conservative research organization, refuted the findings of this study citing its unrealistic
assessment of the economic impact of KRM, while also attacking the "alternatives
analysis" performed by SERTA (a full analysis of this debate to follow in the next
section). Then came the economic crisis of 2008 where fiscal austerity policies became
the new imperative. As the transportation planner I interviewed indicated while there was
bipartisan support for the KRM proposal at the beginning, a political shift occurred in the
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wake of the 2008 financial crisis that changed the political tone. In late 2009 Republican
candidate for Governor Mark Neumann came out against the KRM citing the lack of
evidence showing the proposed line as being economically viable (Forster, 2009). This
would be followed in early 2010 with similar declarations by fellow Republican
candidates Robin Vos (2010) and Scott Walker (Sandler, 2010d). At the same time,
Randal O'Toole of the Cato Institute, another conservative research group, came to speak
at a Racine Tea Party event in opposition of rail and KRM (Ryan, 2010a & 2010d). So
while the shift in political tone and support by politicians can be traced back as far as
2004 when funding became an issue, it seems that the decisive shift came in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis where a combination of fiscally conservative policies and project
scrutiny brought on by conservative groups shifted the political tone of the proposal.
The formation of SERTA was also very important to the discussion of politics.
According to the transit advocate I interviewed, initially planners and other stakeholders
in the planning process, knowing the opposition of the western half of Racine County,
proposed to carve this section of the county out from under the umbrella of SERTA. The
RTA proposed would include all of Milwaukee and Kenosha Counties but only the
eastern half of Racine County. This warrants a brief discussion of two key components of
Racine County's political structure that influenced the trajectory of SERTA and KRM.
First of all, there was political (and lifestyle) polarization separating the two
halves of Racine County. The transit advocate I interviewed described an east-west
divide in Racine County, with rural western Racine County being very conservative, and
the more urban and suburban eastern Racine County, including the City of Racine, as
being more liberal, Interstate 94 basically divided the two sections of the county in half.
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Western Racine County was not in support of the KRM proposal or any tax increases to
fund it (or the RTA more broadly), while eastern Racine County and the City of Racine
itself were counting on KRM to revitalize the local economy. Racine Mayor John
Dickert, a supporter of KRM, feared that "a political scuffle over buses will be the
undoing of the KRM" and would hinder the ability of Racine to attract new jobs and
development (Ryan, 2009c).
Second, because of the structure of the Racine County Board, the City of Racine
actually has very little power, so the western portions of the county could dictate what
happened in the rest of the county. This was something confirmed by Robin Vos in a
video recording of a Tea Party event in Racine where he stated that, "we are fortunate
that in Racine County we have a County Executive and County Board that is controlled
by conservatives, and we should be very proud of that" (Ryan, 2010d). As I will elaborate
on later, this would prove to be significant for KRM. This structure of government refers
to Weir et al.’s (2005) discussion of shifting political dynamics that means less power for
cities and urban areas as suburban and rural voting blocs become more influential.
As described by the transit advocate I interviewed, the move to carve out western
Racine County from the RTA upset some Milwaukee County supervisors who argued
that western Racine County had to pay their fair share. They wanted this area included,
even though studies showed that less than 25% of the revenue for KRM in Racine County
would come from the western section of the county, since it was largely rural. My
interviewee recalled telling the Milwaukee County supervisors not to fight this, because it
would end up killing the proposal.
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The decision to include western Racine County was important to the failure of the
KRM proposal because local Racine County officials, most notably Robin Vos,
eventually became the biggest opponents of the KRM that was forced upon them by
Milwaukee County bureaucrats. The public policy analyst I interviewed substantiated this
by describing how conservative citizen groups and legislators in the Racine area started
to label the proposal as a "boondoggle." As a result, the KRM and the RTA would have
new opposition to contend with. Consequently, this political move by Milwaukee County
leaders became a key event in the failure of the KRM proposal; I also argue that it is
possible that the proposal would have moved along with less opposition had Milwaukee
County leaders not fought for the inclusion of western Racine County, perhaps resulting
in a different outcome.
Now we turn to a discussion of local Milwaukee leaders, and their role in the
failure of the KRM proposal. My analysis shows that support for KRM in Milwaukee
County, a typically Democratic stronghold, was mixed. In 2004 Democratic Mayor Tom
Barrett said he supported the commuter rail plan and was "encouraged that this is a
project that business leaders want to see happen" (Sandler, 2004). However, by 2010 the
Mayor voiced reservations about KRM (Sandler, 2010e). While he was in support of a
downtown streetcar system, his support for rail transit did not necessarily extend to the
KRM proposal. He had concerns about the funding of the proposal as well as the
coordination with Metra to allow transfers to their system in Kenosha. Mayor Barrett
simply said "I'm not going to commit to it" (Sandler, 2010e).
Democratic Representative Gwen Moore showed support for the KRM in her
effort to secure federal funding for the proposal in 2005 (Ryan, 2005). In 2010 however,
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Moore spoke out against KRM, not because she didn't support the proposal, but because
she felt the funding issue that faced MCTS needed to be addressed first, before KRM
continued any further (Sandler, 2010f). Moore had proposed to put KRM on hold for one
year until local bus funding was agreed upon, but her proposal did not garner enough
support to pass (Sandler, 2010f). Moore's argument for putting buses first, seems largely
to come from her need to appeal to her Milwaukee constituents who rely on the bus for
their daily needs; especially since local elections were barely two months away.
However, she still showed support for KRM which would have had four stops in her
congressional district.
Milwaukee County Supervisor Michael Mayo, and Milwaukee County Board
Chairman Lee Holloway were also opposed to the proposal, and went so far as to ask the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to deny the RTA's funding application for
preliminary engineering (Ryan, 2010c). Their opposition was mainly because of the
funding crisis MCTS was facing, an issue they would have to deal with themselves at
some point.
The issue over MCTS funding was also noted by the public policy analyst I
interviewed who discussed how the Milwaukee County Board was very concerned that
KRM was going to divert resources away from MCTS. The county was struggling just to
keep buses afloat and maintain a decent level of service, leaving many to question why
KRM should even be built if current bus transit systems are struggling for funds. These
reservations indicate how important the KRM was not only for mobility, but for the
creation of an RTA that could provide a dedicated source of funding. The public policy
analyst also emphasized that traditionally Democratic constituencies in Milwaukee were
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not out there fighting for KRM. So while conservatives and anti-rail groups formed a
strong coalition against KRM, there was not a coherent voice on the other side
advocating for the proposal.
This leads back to our earlier discussion of governmental coalitions. Unlike the
broad coalitions of transit advocates, developers and business interests, as discussed by
Althshuler and Luberoff (2003) that would fight for these proposals; KRM never had a
broad enough support base to form this type of coalition. Furthermore, the Republicans of
southeast Wisconsin were able to form a party-imposed coalition, as described by Weir et
al. (2005). With Milwaukee's suburban communities aligning with other Republicans at
the state level to fight off costly rail transit proposals, Democrats were not able to broker
similar coalitions to advance KRM. And while Gov. Doyle was able to form a governorbrokered coalition to fit KRM and the creation of an RTA in his agenda, his desire for a
regional solution, which would have been similar to Weir et al.'s (2005) city-suburban
coalition, may have ended up killing the proposal.
The 2010 governor's race showcased the politics of rail in Wisconsin. As Larry
Sandler (2010e) of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel described:
Railroads and politics have one thing in common: They're all about the timing.
Trains run by schedules. Politicians wait for the right moment to make their
moves. Political circumstances have brought three different rail transit plans to the
forefront simultaneously - only to thrust them into an election-year controversy
where some plans may not survive. Politically, all three are linked in the minds of
their opponents, as symbols of unnecessary taxation and skewed transportation
spending priorities. The train debate in recent years has turned partisan, pitting
Democratic rail backers against GOP critics, now the rail projects have emerged
as an issue in the fall governor's race.
Here, Sandler refers to the convergence of three major passenger rail proposals in
Wisconsin at the time; the downtown Milwaukee streetcar, the high speed rail running
from Chicago to Minneapolis-St. Paul, and the KRM commuter rail. The fact is that the
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details of each proposal didn't matter; rail was now a party-line issue and one that would
be at the forefront of the race for Wisconsin Governor.
Republican candidates for Governor, former U.S. Representative Mark Neumann
(Forster, 2009), Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker (Sandler, 2010d), and state
Representative Robin Vos (Vos, 2010) were all revving up their bids to clinch the
Republican nomination and used their opposition to rail as a political tool to secure votes.
Also, as discussed earlier, Republican constituencies typically align with highway
lobbying groups that are highly influential especially during important elections such as
this. So it is possible that highway lobby interests were also guiding this anti-rail
discourse. Based on my analysis, by this time it was simply too late for KRM to survive.
As the public policy analyst I interviewed described, "KRM was still on life support" at
this time, and seemed doomed to fail.
Finally, we turn to a discussion of three key political figures and their role in the
failure of the KRM proposal. These key actors are: then Milwaukee County Executive
Scott Walker (who eventually became Governor), Republican State Representative Robin
Vos (who eventually became Assembly Speaker), and then Democratic Governor Jim
Doyle.
As described by the public policy analyst I interviewed, then-Milwaukee County
Executive Scott Walker was initially supportive of the idea of commuter rail as an
alternative to light rail, but his support only went so far. In a SERTA board meeting in
2007, the committee agreed upon funding the RTA with a 0.5% sales tax. This was tabled
at the next meeting when Scott Walker (along with Racine County Executive Bill
McReynolds) opposed the sales tax increase (Ryan, 2007b). Then in May of 2010, as
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Walker was revving up his bid for governor, he officially came out against the KRM
commuter rail proposal (Sandler, 2010d). While always being opposed to any sales tax
increase to pay for KRM, he was not a vocal opponent of the proposal. His statement in
opposition specifically refers to the shift in politics described in my interviews and
captured in my analysis. As SERTA vice chairman, Julia Taylor told Larry Sandler of the
Journal Sentinel "over the years, Scott has expressed support for the concept of commuter
rail. I'm disappointed that he is changing his position" (Sandler, 2010d). The transit
advocate I interviewed remarked on how Scott Walker took on the high-speed rail issue
as a campaign issue, leaving many Wisconsinites to confuse KRM with high-speed rail
and buy into the political discourse of rail as a costly tax-burden for Wisconsin.
As mentioned previously, one of the most vocal opponents of the KRM commuter
rail was Republican State Representative Robin Vos of Racine County. However
initially, Vos was not adamantly opposed to KRM, just how it was to be funded (Burke,
2007a). He showed support by asking that the KRM be brought to a referendum vote and
to let the people decide its fate. But this may have just been a veil hiding his true
opposition to the KRM, seen in his voting pattern on issues surrounding the proposal and
his failure to align with the Racine business community that was strongly in favor of
KRM (Burke, 2007a). Then in an editorial in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in April 10,
2010, Vos came out as being decidedly opposed to the KRM and argued that
transportation in southeast Wisconsin was about priorities and that KRM would drain
scarce resources when the priority should be fixing the roads and buses that are already in
trouble (Vos, 2010). Vos also blamed SERTA for not keeping buses a priority and only
worrying about funding for the failing bus systems after KRM's future depended on a
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stabilized bus system. But as my analysis revealed, SERTA officials were just as
concerned about funding the struggling bus systems in the region as they were a
commuter rail line.
As the transit advocate I spoke with revealed, Robin Vos also linked himself with
other Racine County conservatives such as Fred Young, a former Racine businessman to
fight the KRM proposal. Fred Young was on the board of the Cato Institute and the
Reason Foundation, two groups that vocally opposed rail proposals throughout the United
States. They formed a coalition to stop the KRM proposal in its tracks. This was the
beginning of what one might call the anti-transit coalition that fought to stop the KRM
proposal. In one instance, a rail transit opponent named Randall O'Toole from the Cato
Institute was brought in to speak at a Tea Party event in Racine. In a video recording of
this event, Vos made it clear that he was fine with bringing the issue to referendum
because he knew it would not pass and was depending on his Racine County Republican
supporters to make sure the KRM proposal failed (Ryan, 2010d). My interviewee
described how this team of opponents would go around and distort the facts about KRM
and the RTA, something for which people behind the initiative were not prepared. These
proponents were caught off-guard by the opposition that emerged in 2009 and 2010. The
push-back continued with national conservative organizations such as the Americans for
Prosperity, throwing money and resources into local elections; transit and KRM were
used to wedge the voting public and help the Republicans gain the majority in the state
legislature and fill the Governor's mansion.
In 2011, once Scott Walker was Governor, Robin Vos was Assembly Speaker,
and the political tide had changed, proposals to dissolve Wisconsin's RTA's (SERTA
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included) were introduced ultimately killing the KRM commuter rail proposal in its
tracks (Jones, 2011). This proposal put the KRM on indefinite hold. But as I alluded to
earlier the proposal was already doomed to fail by this point. It was not long after the
budget committee voted to dissolve all of the state's regional transit authorities (Marley,
2011) that KRM was officially declared dead in a July 25, 2011 Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel article (Sandler, 2011). This move was spearheaded by Representative Robin
Vos and backed by Governor Scott Walker and the rest of the Republican-dominated
state Legislature. So it would seem the natural conclusion would be to blame the
Republicans for the failure of the KRM proposal via their efforts to dissolve all of the
state's regional transit authorities. This conclusion has been stated even recently; as a
Journal Sentinel writer, James Rowen proclaimed, "Let's be clear: decisions principally
by Gov. Walker and Republican legislative leaders, with the support of conservative
commentators, have undermined transit and area residents who use it" (Rowen, 2013).
However, by this point KRM was already "on life support" as the public policy analyst
argued, so the attack on the RTAs was merely the final nail in the coffin.
Governor Jim Doyle, a Democrat and a supporter of KRM and other passenger
rail proposals, also played an important political role in the failure of the KRM proposal.
Doyle was insistent on the provision of a regional solution to the funding of KRM and the
RTA. When legislators gave Milwaukee County the approval to create its own RTA and
increase local sales taxes to help fund a Milwaukee Transit Authority, the provision was
vetoed by Governor Jim Doyle citing his desire for a regional solution (Sandler, 2010e).
Additionally, as the public policy analyst I interviewed commented, "[Governor] Doyle
was not a Lee Holloway fan [and] you had a county board that people even in Democratic
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circles did not trust." So it would seem that Governor Doyle did not want the Milwaukee
County Board, or Lee Holloway, to be in control of a Milwaukee County only RTA and
its funds. The transit advocate I spoke with voiced similar sentiments, saying that KRM
leaders and business leaders thought that money at the Milwaukee County level was not
being managed well and there was fear of having the proposal attached to this
mismanagement. This interviewee also felt that Governor Doyle thought it would be easy
to arrive at a regional solution and vote on the RTA again, but it proved to be harder than
the governor had anticipated. I argue that the Governor’s veto citing the need for a more
regional solution was an event that, while well intentioned to bring about a larger
regional funding mechanism, showed his short-sightedness given the contentiousness of
the previous light rail debate.
An analysis of the politics behind the failure of the KRM proposal reveals how
the decisions of a few individuals changed the trajectory of the proposal from being on its
way to preliminary engineering, to being declared dead in the wake of the 2010
governor's race. As this analysis has shown, opposition on the part of Republicans does
not adequately explain the failure of the KRM proposal. As I see it, there was an overall
political shift in southeast Wisconsin that left the KRM proposal as a victim of increased
scrutiny and fiscal austerity. There was also mixed support from Milwaukee's Democratic
constituency and especially the Milwaukee County Board that also factored into the
politics of KRM. The Milwaukee County Board showed mixed support for the proposal,
and was widely known for their mismanagement of money. But most importantly, their
insistence that western Racine County pay their fair share into the RTA became one of
the key events that changed the trajectory of the KRM proposal. Representative Robin
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Vos, while not initially coming out against KRM, joined forces with national
conservative groups that scrutinized the proposal. The RTA compromise was then vetoed
by the Governor which was probably the most decisive political move that put the KRM
on "life support." Finally, when the 2010 governor's race got underway, the KRM and rail
transit in general was used as an issue to wedge voters; Republicans distorted the reality
of proposals throughout the campaign. Once Robin Vos gained his leadership position in
the state legislature he introduced legislation to dissolve all of the state's RTA's, including
SERTA, leaving the proposal stalled at the station.
3. Expectations of KRM
This section addresses the expectations of KRM. The analysis that follows looks
at the overall expectations for transit-oriented development and economic development,
the specific expectations for this development in Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha, and
the larger expectation of regional transit cooperation.
Transit advocates and planners believed that KRM was a way to stimulate highdensity urban development near stations where careful planning of land use was key
(SEWRPC, 2011b). Transit-oriented development was seen as the most important
element of land use development near stations with dense development patterns laid out
in a transit and pedestrian friendly manner (Transit NOW, 2012). Throughout my
research I saw transit-oriented development as a common discussion topic among those
involved with the proposal. A Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article from February 23, 2006
boasted that the KRM corridor was home to large amounts of available commercial and
residential space that could attract "high-tech jobs and employees" once the necessary
transportation infrastructure was in place (Mariano, 2006). So not only was development
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of the station locations important for KRM, it was also important for this development to
create areas of consumption and labor to promote capital accumulation.
The prospects for economic development along the entire corridor were the
subject of much discussion. The transit advocate interviewed described how economic
developers from out of town would come to look at the possibilities available along the
entire corridor and were amazed at the potential that was being missed. The transit
advocate further discussed the vast amounts of open land along the rail lines, and near the
proposed stations that had tremendous potential. KRM quickly became labeled as an
economic development driver and a vast untapped resource of new jobs and transitoriented development. Developers were anxious to capitalize on this opportunity and
businesses were on board as well.
A 2007 economic impact study was completed by the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Institute for Survey and Policy Research. The study boasted of the $560
million impact from over 4,700 new jobs during construction, expanded tourism from
northern Illinois with a $20 million dollar impact, and increased development along the
corridor and especially at station locations, increasing property values up to 20%
(Institute for Survey and Policy Research, 2007). Furthermore, the study argued that
development in general would increase exponentially and that anywhere from 20% to
50% of this development would not happen without the KRM. Ridership estimates
showed about 1.7 million passengers per year would use the commuter rail service.
SEWRPC had conducted earlier studies of the impact of KRM, but these reports were
less focused on specific economic development outcomes. The 1998 report focused on
land use, existing transportation infrastructure, and the planning of potential commuter
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rail (SEWRPC, 1998). And the 2003 study, while discussing the economic development
opportunities, was more general about the impact and less sensational about the outcomes
(SEWRPC, 2003).
Not long after the 2007 economic development report was released a Racine
Journal Times article boasted about the "substantial" economic impact KRM would have
on the region (Burke, 2007b). Similarly, Rosemary Potter of Transit NOW in a February
2007 Biz Times Milwaukee article discussed the findings of the report and was hopeful
that this study would "help to quantify the substantial economic benefits that KRM is
expected to bring to businesses in the region" (Potter, 2007). Around the same time
SEWRPC released a report that used the figures from the UWM report to illustrate the
economic potential of KRM (SEWRPC, 2007a). Furthermore, SERTA chairman Karl
Ostby showed optimism for the economic development outcomes that KRM could
produce (Ryan, 2007b). So proponents used the 2007 economic development report as an
opportunity to frame the discussion of KRM around economic development and away
from the issues of funding and politics that were plaguing the proposal. But while
proponents were now framing the proposal around economic development the media still
largely focused on funding and politics in their coverage of KRM.
Then Rubin and Poole (2008) released the aforementioned study that questioned
the thoroughness of the alternatives analysis conducted by SERTA, but most directly
targeted the economic development analysis of the 2007 University of Wisconsin Milwaukee study. The authors argued that the economic development heralded in the
2007 report "appears doubtful" and criticized the alternatives analysis completed by
SERTA and argued that several bus alternatives were not considered, especially as it
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concerns cost versus benefit with bus alternatives costing significantly less than the
commuter rail option. The report concluded by saying:
We find the projections of economic and real estate benefits of commuter rail to
not be credible in methodology or in purported results and suggest that
transportation decisions such as this be made based on transportation costs and
benefits (p. 7).
The public policy analyst I interviewed also questioned the claims of economic
development and transit-oriented development and felt they were "oversold from the getgo." The policy analyst further argued that all the hype behind these claims may have
been what caused people to really scrutinize the proposal making it easy for detractors to
"poke holes in some of the arguments" and cast the proposal as a "complete boondoggle."
And as discussed earlier, while there may have been potential for economic development
and transit-oriented development, the attention that these discussions garnered may have
put the proposal under deeper scrutiny. The transportation planner I spoke with was
positive about the potential for development near the stations, but was also aware that
some people were a bit more "sensationalist" about the potential of KRM in terms of
creating lots of jobs, and solving additional problems.
In the wake of Rubin and Poole's (2008) report, economic development began to
be a topic of discussion in the media. McIlheran (2008) and Hollenbeck (2009) focused
on how much commuter rail would cost and questioned if rail was really going to lead to
increased economic development. Biz Times Milwaukee (2008) coverage was more
factual and included comment from Ken Yunker of SEWRPC who backed the findings
from the 2007 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee study and refuted the criticisms of
the Rubin and Poole study. And Rice (2009) discussed Rubin's scheduled appearance in
Milwaukee in mid-January 2009, where he would discuss his study and help people to
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make an "informed decision" about the KRM proposal (Rice, 2009). Rubin and Poole's
report made economic development a subject of discussion, but not in the way that
proponents had hoped.
Overall, the 2007 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee economic impact study
changed the way proponents framed the discussion about KRM, but once the 2008 report
by Rubin and Poole was released this framing of the discussion around economic benefits
caused the proposal to come under deeper scrutiny. In the end, all of this discussion about
the KRM's costs and questionable economic benefits began to cast doubt in the eyes of
the public and left many to question not only the economic benefits of KRM, but also if
KRM commuter rail was right for southeast Wisconsin.
Some of the economic development debate was less focused on transit-oriented
development at station locations, and more focused on regional connections to the greater
Chicago area and the economic development potential this meant for the region
(Mariano, 2006). Throughout my analysis the connection to Chicago was seen as a large
part of the discourse. As the transit advocate I interviewed discussed, the connection to
Chicago was huge for KRM, especially for Racine since they lacked a rail connection to
the economic powerhouse in the Chicago area. As I observed throughout the research this
meant capitalizing on the economic development engine in Chicago and northern Illinois
to foster new development here in Wisconsin. KRM was seen as a way for southeast
Wisconsin to remain competitive in the market for new businesses and industry
(Mariano, 2006). Furthermore, KRM would fill the void left by Amtrak service between
Milwaukee and Chicago focusing on the suburb-to-suburb trips and city-to-suburb trips
that are not part of the Amtrak market (Sandler, 2003). This new type of service would
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make it easier for commuters to access jobs in the communities of northern Illinois, and
for Milwaukee and Racine jobs to be more accessible to commuters in northern Illinois.
The communities along the KRM route consciously studied and planned for
transit-oriented developments around station locations (SEWRPC, 2011b). A look at the
SEWRPC archives revealed that all of the communities with stops along the route had
completed transit-oriented development proposals with a variety of approaches, but all
focusing on higher density and pedestrian access to the station (SEWRPC, 2007b). Some
of the communities chose to use different types of developmental incentives including
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts, or the expansion of current Business
Improvement Districts (BID's), while other communities chose to leave it up to the open
market (SEWRPC, 2007b). While different approaches were used, all had the goal of
increasing economic development. As both the transportation planner and transit
advocates I interviewed discussed, transit-oriented development plans for the station
locations was a huge focus of the initial research on the KRM proposal. The specific
plans for each station considered the local context, and the development goals of the
community like the examples from Washington D.C. But as was also learned from the
example of D.C., transit-oriented development near the stations in the urban areas of
Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha would fit in with the local urban context, whereas
development in the more suburban or rural station locations could mean isolated islands
of transit-oriented development in a sea of auto-centric development; which does very
little to increase transit ridership.
We now turn to a look at the specific development seen for the major urban
centers of Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee. The areas near these stations stood out
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because the surrounding areas were already conducive to transit-oriented development as
they were planned in the pre-automobile age (Southeastern Regional Transit Authority,
2010).
The visions for possible transit-oriented development were widely discussed for
Milwaukee's downtown station. The research process showed that the area at the south
end of downtown was seen as a prime area for redevelopment, especially as it relates to
KRM. A study of the station on West St. Paul Avenue predicted a very different look for
the area by 2020 (Ryan, 2006). The area would be transformed as the development of the
booming Third Ward to the east met with the station development. St. Paul Avenue
would be transformed with high density multi-story buildings with apartments and
condos on top of ground floor retail. The sidewalks would become more pedestrianfriendly through beautification and safety updates. The area could have thousands of new
residential units and millions of square feet of commercial space available by 2035. What
I gathered from my analysis was that this area would be transformed, and would
(re)develop the south end of downtown.
The City of Racine had a lot to gain with the introduction of KRM commuter rail.
My analysis revealed that Racine business leaders and local officials were hopeful for the
potential economic development impact of KRM. These leaders saw commuter rail as
vital to the future of Racine's economy and argued that transit options such as KRM have
continually proven to "revitalize communities, enhance economic development, and most
importantly, serve to create new jobs and connect workers to existing jobs" (Racine
Journal Times, 2010). What this shows is how the city was depending on KRM service to
drive economic development and provide needed connections to the economies of
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Milwaukee and Chicago. As Racine Mayor John Dickert stated, "To rebuild a city like
Racine, you have to have infrastructure . . . you have to have an effective and efficient
transit system" (Rigney-Baxter, 2010).
Racine-based SC Johnson saw commuter rail as a way to attract young
professionals to their company (Grundle, 2006). This is something Rosemary Potter,
executive director of Transit NOW, agreed with citing studies that show "young talent
will go where commuter rail is located" (Grundle, 2006). In my assessment, SC Johnson
saw the commuter rail as important for attracting the right kind of employees to work at
their headquarters. The transit advocate I interviewed argued that S.C Johnson made
commuter rail a priority. They attended budget hearings, and lobbied in Madison because
they saw the value in KRM commuter rail, not only in terms of economic development,
but also with the regional connections to Milwaukee and Chicago. Having a large
international company advocating for KRM highlighted the importance of the proposal
for the region, and Racine specifically.
The downtown Racine Business Improvement District saw KRM as a way to
increase business activity, and keep local businesses thriving (Downtown Racine
Business Improvement District No. 1, 2011). With a vested interest in keeping downtown
Racine a vibrant place for shopping, dining, and other activities the prospects for
economic development surrounding the station was a huge priority for the downtown
Racine businesses. As the transit advocated I interviewed discussed, the Racine station
had the potential to revive an area of the city near the proposed station. Likewise, Joel
Rast, Professor of Political Science and Urban Studies, and the director of the Center for
Economic Development at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, argued that the KRM
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commuter rail proposal would likely help Racine even more than it would Milwaukee
(Steinkraus, 2011). I see the evidence as clear; Racine was counting on the KRM to
create economic development both near the station and to stimulate development
throughout the city. The connection to both Milwaukee and Chicago had a huge potential
to revive the economy in the city.
The City of Kenosha knew the benefits of transit-oriented development through
the construction of their Harbor Park development, which was specifically tied to the
Metra station in Kenosha (Transit NOW, 2012). There were certainly expectations for
future development near the station and continued economic development in the area
once the KRM line was also tied to the station. My research showed that Kenosha was
ready to expand upon their economic development agenda, especially in the station area,
even before the future of KRM was certain. In-fact the city took on the task of renovating
their century old station by raising money on their own and applying for their own federal
money separate from the KRM proposal (Rohde, 2010).
The expectations of regional transit cooperation were also tied up in the debate
about KRM. As the public policy analyst I interviewed argued, KRM was about more
than just the operation of a commuter rail line, it was also about the creation of an RTA
serving Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha Counties. When then-Governor Doyle
introduced the legislation for regions to create transit authorities he was hopeful that this
would allow them to come together and work on the transit issues facing their specific
areas (Transit NOW, n.d.). The transit advocate I interviewed saw KRM as "a platform
for our region to start working together" and gave new hope to the creation of an RTA.
However, I argue that the vision for the way these RTA's would have been structured
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may have been beyond the capabilities of southeast Wisconsin. All of my interviewee’s
indicated that, local leaders were hopeful that KRM would bring about the creation of an
RTA as a solution to the funding crisis of local bus systems; as I see it none of them had
the political will to get it done.
The policy analyst I spoke with discussed how then Milwaukee County Executive
Scott Walker was supportive of the idea of an RTA and even tried to pull Waukesha
County in as part of it. The transit advocate I spoke with clarified how, although this bill
did not include Waukesha County, they would have been able to join under certain
conditions. The prospect of bringing Waukesha County into the RTA was monumental,
considering the legacy of the east-west corridor debate. However, the public policy
analyst clarified that Waukesha County officials were not in support, so that idea quickly
went by the wayside. The policy analyst argued that the fundamental reason why Walker
was not against KRM at first was the prospect of an RTA that could help support a
struggling MCTS. But as became clear in my analysis, his staunch opposition to a transit
sales tax to fund local buses showed that he supported an RTA in concept but, when it
came to the reality of paying for it, his support waned. In addition, the transit advocate I
interviewed argued that Waukesha County officials were influenced to not join the RTA
because of the falsehoods articulated by Robin Vos and his cohorts. In my estimation,
this was the moment when the talk of regional transit cooperation turned divisive and
KRM's future became questionable.
The transportation planner I spoke with felt that SERTA was not only essential
for KRM to be funded and operated, but that it was also a key expectation of the
proposal. The transportation planner also felt that ultimately the dissolving of SERTA,
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and other RTA's in the state, was the primary reason for the KRM's "indefinite
postponement." However, as my analysis has shown there are several other key decisions
by individual actors along the way that paved the way for the proposals failure.
Throughout my analysis it became clear that the biggest expectation of KRM was
the creation of an RTA - an RTA that could have supplied both local busses and regional
commuter rail with dedicated funding sources and finally link the region with transit
service that would have been "easy, convenient and reliable" (Transit NOW, 2012). This
expectation became the largest issue attached with KRM and transit advocates, policy
analysts and planners agreed. However, this expectation could have also spelled its
demise since those against the proposal knew that KRM was attached to the larger goal of
regional transit cooperation, something opponents maintained would lead to loss of local
control and the funneling of funds towards the needs of other counties. Then Governor
Doyle vetoed the Milwaukee Transit Authority proposed after SERTA was unable to
come to a consensus on a funding mechanism for KRM and the local bus systems. This
seemed to be the best hope for a regional funding consensus, especially in light of earlier
debates.
Let’s refer back to the earlier examples of Atlanta (Golembiewsi & Kiepper,
1976) and south Florida (Alpert et al., 2006), where the final reality of regional transit
cooperation looked very different from their original visions. The structure of the
compromise for the KRM and SERTA was very similar to the example of south Florida
with each county keeping local funding autonomy for their local systems, and there being
a separate funding source for the regional rail system. Along with this, Ulberg’s models
of regional transit cooperation (as cited in Meligrana, 1999) are also significant to KRM
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in understanding the degree of integration seen in southeast Wisconsin, and the
possibilities for coordination. To review, Ulberg's hierarchy consisted of: complete
independence, informal coordination, formal coordination, partial integration, and full
integration. The bus systems in Milwaukee County and the cities of Kenosha and Racine
would most likely be considered in the category of "complete independence," with most
service stopping at the County lines in the example of MCTS or city boundaries in
Kenosha and Racine. It is possible that the compromise vetoed by then-Governor Doyle
(and also seen in the example of south Florida) could have moved the region closer to
goal of complete integration and could have been considered "partial integration," with a
regional agency coordinating transit and, in the case of KRM, operating the service, while
the local systems would be run independently and the two systems interacting at transfer
stations.
When viewing KRM (and SERTA) and the compromise that came out of the
legislature through Ulberg's hierarchy, it is easy to see the change in regional cooperation
that was part of this compromise. Viewing the issue of regional transit coordination as a
hierarchy as well as through the examples of other transit agencies, one can get a clearer
vision of what regional transit coordination can look like compared to what it was
previously, and the different ways it can work. I argue that if then-Governor Doyle had
considered the alternative approaches to regional transit cooperation seen in Atlanta and
south Florida, or if he had considered the major steps up the regional transit hierarchy
that the compromise brought southeast Wisconsin, KRM could be running today and
local buses would be funded with dedicated funding sources.
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As I see it, KRM had two predominant expectations. First was the provision of
economic development and transit-oriented development at the station locations and
throughout the entire region. And second, but probably most important, was the creation
of a Regional Transit Authority and agreement over regional transit issues.
Unfortunately, KRM would never accomplish either, and perhaps the expectation of one
33-mile long commuter rail line to bring about regional transit cooperation and expansive
economic development was more than should have been expected. KRM was expected to
transform the south end of downtown Milwaukee near the station, reinvigorate the
struggling economy of Racine, and expand upon Kenosha's vibrant transit-oriented
developments. In addition KRM was to bring about cooperation between three counties
with varying demographics, and lifestyles. I argue that it was not only the expectation of
creating an RTA, but what that RTA was supposed to look like that doomed KRM. The
example of south Florida's RTA provides parallels to the KRM proposal. Both involved
three counties connecting major population centers and both had a struggle with the
provision of an RTA to serve the entire area. I believe that if then-Governor Doyle had
not vetoed the separate Milwaukee Transit Authority that was to fund and run MCTS and
have KRM remain separate, the Milwaukee area would have a similar set-up to the south
Florida RTA and could be running today. In the end, the expectations for economic
development that were highly scrutinized as part of the shift in politics in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis, and Governor Doyle's expectation for the type of regional transit
cooperation he wanted to see were important factors in the demise of the KRM proposal.
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4. Funding Issues for KRM
This section looks at the role of funding in the failure of the KRM proposal. My
analysis showed that funding played a role in the KRM proposal's failure in three key
ways: the large amount of public funding the KRM would require, the federal funding
requirements, and the local funding obstacles.
Early on, it became clear that KRM would require a large amount of public
funding to cover capital costs as well as operating costs. With total KRM capital costs
estimated to be about $230 million (Ryan, 2010c), with some estimates as high as $250
million (Rubin and Poole, 2008), and a low operating cost recovery rate (the amount of
costs recovered by fares) of 15-17% (SEWRPC, 2003), funding was sure to be an
obstacle for KRM. This funding dilemma, however, was not unique to KRM, as other
new commuter rail systems had similar cost recovery figures (SEWRPC, 2003). More
established systems typically boast recovery rates of around 40-60%. Reflecting back on
Altshuler and Luberoff's (2003) earlier discussion of transit funding and remembering the
structure of transit funding in the 1950s, we are reminded how transit used to be expected
to recover all of its costs from fares, which explains why this cost recovery figure is so
important to the viability of new proposals. Neoliberal devolution also plays into this,
where federal transportation legislation continues to subsidize highway infrastructure
costs at a higher rate than transit, leaving state and local governments to cover a larger
percentage of transit project expenses.
SERTA was applying for the federal government's "New Starts" program which
could have covered as much as 60% of the costs of construction for KRM (Thoreson,
2010). As discussed earlier, the New Starts program was a federally funded program for
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new fixed guideway transit service available to local and regional authorities on a
competitive basis (Lowe, 2013). SERTA and SEWRPC knew that securing this funding
was essential for the proposal to move forward. SEWRPC was optimistic that Wisconsin
could get this funding even given that the state had has never before received federal
money for a proposal such as this, as the process tended to favor larger urban centers like
New York, Houston, and Los Angeles (Thoreson, 2010).
During the application process, the FTA voiced concerns about the KRM proposal
because a dedicated source of funding was not secured for the local bus systems in
Milwaukee County and the cities of Racine and Kenosha (Sandler, 2010c). The FTA said
they would allow preliminary engineering, but that funding for the final stages of the
proposal would be held until the funding issues were resolved. The transportation planner
I spoke with agreed that the FTA voiced concerns about local funding of buses and that
SEWRPC actually pulled their initial application in 2007 for the New Starts Program
because of these concerns. So while federal funding was potentially available to cover a
large amount of the capital costs of KRM, the proposal was hampered by the issues of
local funding that had to be figured out before KRM could move any further.
The transportation planner I interviewed argued that the issue of funding for
transit is unique in the Milwaukee area since funding is largely dependent on the state
and federal governments. This funding has not increased with inflation leaving counties
and local governments to fill the gap using property taxes. Therefore, the biggest issue for
funding with the KRM was finding a dedicated funding source.
Many local funding proposals for KRM were floated around including additional
gas taxes, state funding (Sandler, 2004), using the sales tax revenue from vehicle
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purchases (Walker, 2007), or an overall sales tax increase anywhere from .05% to 0.5%
(Resler, 2006), and finally an increase of the car rental fee by $13 (Grundle, 2007). While
each of these solutions was debated in the media, SERTA focused on the car rental fee
and sales taxes. Each of these solutions had their benefits and drawbacks, but my analysis
showed that the car rental fee increase had the most vocal backlash.
Car-rental companies came out against the car rental fee saying it would hurt their
business by driving away customers and could force them to reduce staffing (Ryan,
2009a). The transportation planner I spoke with also discussed the pushback from the
rental car industry itself. It was clear from the research that car rental companies felt
targeted and feared the repercussions of these extra fees. There was even a bill introduced
in congress that would prevent local and federal governments from imposing such fees.
Those in support of the bill, including consumer advocacy groups, auto manufacturers
and rental agencies, said that these fees should not go to "funding projects that have
nothing to do with renting vehicles" (Sandler & Marrero, 2010). Despite this vocal
backlash, however, the car rental fee remained part of the funding mechanism for KRM.
The idea of a regional sales tax seemed the consensus way to go. As one Racine
citizen stated in the Feb. 2, 2007 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, "A small extra tax to build
and operate this KRM commuter rail line is not asking a great deal from the general
public" (Myers, 2007). However, political support for a transit tax was difficult. State
Senator John Lehman of Racine said that the voters in his district would never approve of
a sales tax to support transit (Ryan, 2009b) and Milwaukee County Executive Walker, as
described earlier, was also opposed to a sales tax to support transit.
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One thing became clear throughout my analysis - Milwaukee County officials
were particularly important in the debate over funding, since they were concerned about
funding going directly to KRM and not helping the struggling Milwaukee County Transit
System (Ryan, 2007a). One of the goals in establishing SERTA was that a regional
source of funding would be identified for KRM, which could also to help support local
bus systems. In May of 2007 SERTA officials decided on a $13 car rental fee increase to
fund KRM and a 0.5% sales tax to fund local transit, but the sales tax increase was later
tabled leaving only the car rental fee (Ryan, 2007b). This provided funding for KRM, but
not for local bus systems. Subsequently, the $13 car rental fee was denied by the state
legislature as a funding source, and the RTA legislation that created SERTA as a
temporary authority did not pass so funding was again on hold (Transit NOW, n.d.). In
my view, despite support for the proposal from residents and many local officials, state
politics played into the funding for KRM and an RTA, where the proposal was supported
in principle but not in practice.
In Milwaukee, voters narrowly approved an advisory referendum in support of a
1% sales tax increase to pay for transit as well as other services (Ryan, 2009b). This
meant that a sales tax in Milwaukee could be initiated to fund transit. Similar measures in
Racine and Kenosha failed by large margins with 80% of Racine voters and up to 88% of
Kenosha County voters opposing a sales tax to fund transit (Sandler, 2010b). So while
Milwaukee voters understood the need for dedicated funding for transit, Racine and
Kenosha County residents were soundly against this measure. As the transit advocate I
spoke with argued, the people of Milwaukee are generally supportive of transit, but the
surrounding suburban counties do not appreciate it and don't want to pay for it. This
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points to another interesting phenomenon found throughout my research - the urban
versus rural divide that was a huge factor in determining funding for KRM. In the end,
Milwaukee County was prepared to levy a sales tax to fund transit, while Kenosha and
Racine were not.
The 2009-2011 state budget, signed on June 29, 2009, established SERTA as a
permanent RTA and allowed them to fund and operate KRM commuter rail using the
rental car fee (Transit NOW, n.d.). This measure should have put KRM over its final
hurdle and the proposal should have been ready to move forward, but as we will see, the
continued debate over a regional funding solution for KRM and local buses became the
real issue. The transit planner I interviewed explained how the Joint Finance Committee
divided SERTA (and KRM) from local bus funding, forming the Milwaukee Transit
Authority. This would allow Milwaukee County to levy a local tax to support MCTS,
outside of the regional framework for KRM (Sander, 2010e). However, the governor
vetoed the proposed Milwaukee Transit Authority citing his desire for a regional solution.
I argue that this move, on the part of Governor Doyle would prove to be more significant
than he had anticipated.
As the transit advocate I spoke with argued, Doyle probably thought that it
wouldn't be a big deal for the counties to come up with a regional solution for funding
buses and the KRM together under one mechanism. What I don't think he considered was
that this may have been the best compromise on which local officials could agree. I also
argue that he was completely unaware of the scrutiny passenger rail would face in the
upcoming 2010 Governor's race, and how it would affect the funding for an RTA.
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The veto meant that SERTA could continue progress on the KRM, but that
dedicated funding for local bus systems had not been agreed upon. However, this was not
enough to keep the KRM moving forward, since a good commuter rail system needs a
good local bus system to serve as a feeder. Funding for local buses was very important, a
point with which the transit advocate I interviewed also agreed. Unfortunately, an April
22, 2010 Daily Reporter article indicated that the debate over a sales tax for transit would
be put off for another year (Ryan, 2010b); which would move the issue into a new
political climate under the Governorship of Scott Walker and a Republican-dominated
legislature.
All three of the individuals I interviewed agreed that funding for KRM was
wrapped up in the larger issue of funding for local bus systems, especially MCTS. The
transportation planner discussed how SERTA board members were worried about the
funding of what they called a "shiny new train" when local bus systems were struggling.
In summary, funding for KRM was a concern, especially given the low farerecovery rate and high initial capital costs of the proposal. Soon funding was also
attached to the need to stabilize the funding issues of the local bus systems, especially
MCTS. For KRM to be successful, local bus connections were essential to get riders to
their final destinations. But the region just could not come up with a consensus for how to
fund KRM and local buses together as the counties kept fighting against each other
instead of working with each other. The RTA legislation that came out of the Joint
Finance Committee separated funding for MCTS from the KRM proposal, something that
Governor Doyle vetoed; a move which I argue made the future of KRM uncertain. Now
KRM funding was secured, but funding for the buses was in question with pressure
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looming from the FTA to have the dedicated funding secured before the proposal could
move beyond preliminary engineering.
5. KRM and the Light Rail Debate
This section addresses the question of the impact of the previous light rail debate
(and the larger east-west corridor debate) on the failure of the KRM proposal. My
analysis revealed that the light rail debate impacted the KRM proposal in three key ways:
labeling commuter rail as a better alternative to light rail, the connections between the
two proposals, and the different approaches taken.
Throughout my analysis it became clear that the light rail debate left behind a
legacy of opposition, and somehow KRM seemed to be able to avoid this. As Larry
Sandler from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported, the idea of commuter rail brought
widespread support and didn't have to contend with the same level of resistance as light
rail proposals (Sandler, 2003). The public policy analyst I interviewed argued that, "KRM
came about and almost happened as a direct result of what happened with the east-west
corridor." In the beginning stages of the KRM proposal, those that were opposed to light
rail because of the expense involved saw commuter rail as a better alternative. And as the
transportation planner I spoke with argued, those who understood the different purposes
of light rail and commuter rail never connected the two proposals and judged them on
their own merits. So perhaps the legacy of the light rail debate was positive for the KRM,
at least in the way it framed the issue of commuter rail as a better alternative to light rail.
However, as the public policy analyst argued, soon all rail turned politically divisive and
became something conservatives did not support. Similarly, the transportation planner
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discussed how those that were just anti-rail connected the two proposals into a larger
framework of passenger rail as being unnecessary.
The proposals did have a few connections in terms of their demise, their goal of
regional cooperation, and their connection in a broader debate about passenger rail. In
both cases, while funding seemed to be the issue that was debated; the actual demise of
both proposals was decided by Republican officials making a conscious decision to stop
each of the rail proposals in their tracks. In the case of light rail, Waukesha County
Executive Finley killed light rail by vetoing further study of the east-west corridor. In the
case of KRM the Republican dominated legislature disbanded all of the state's regional
transit authorities (RTA), taking away the power of the SERTA board to fund and operate
the KRM line. However, as my analysis of the KRM has revealed, the actions of other
political figures put the future of the KRM proposal in question long before this
legislative action.
Both proposals were also part of the larger issue of regional transit cooperation.
While the light rail was about cooperation between Waukesha and Milwaukee counties,
the KRM was about cooperation between Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha counties and
any other county that wanted to join the RTA. But the proposals were still impacted by
the larger issues of political polarization and urban versus rural lifestyles in the region;
themes that I saw through my research on both light rail and KRM. The transit advocate I
spoke with pointed to these issues of Milwaukee versus the suburbs that were common in
both debates. The mere fact that regional cooperation for transit in southeast Wisconsin
has now failed twice is indicative of the divisiveness of these issues and will continue to
be the legacy of both proposals. Additionally, as argued earlier the compromise that came
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out of the east-west corridor set a precedent for the regional transportation priorities of
southeast Wisconsin.
The east-west corridor debate also relates to the KRM debate in that the
Milwaukee streetcar proposal is slated to connect with the Milwaukee Intermodal Station,
where the KRM would have terminated, in downtown Milwaukee. And so, in many ways
the two proposals became linked, along with high-speed rail from Chicago to
Minneapolis through Milwaukee and Madison, as wasteful big-government projects that
would become nothing but a tax-burden. And in my opinion, had the KRM commuter rail
been established, the future of the Milwaukee streetcar line would be bright; since it
would help connect commuters terminating at the downtown train station to the rest of
downtown Milwaukee. As Kris Martinsek said in a July 26, 2003 Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel article, "I think the biggest tragedy would be if these two projects [light rail and
commuter rail] ended up getting pitted against one another" (Sandler, 2003). And while
they were never pitted against each other, I do see the legacy of the east-west corridor
debate as something that KRM had to contend with.
As pointed out in my interview with the transit advocate, the two proposals also
differed in their approach. My interviewee explained how light rail, "could have gotten a
lot further had there been a more reasonable strategy of education up-front." The transit
advocate pointed out how the first few years of KRM was for educating the public,
meeting with business people, doing presentations and merely getting the information
out. I see this as perhaps a positive outcome of the light rail debate, where a change in
approach was seen as the best way to move KRM forward. The light rail skipped this
important step and so the public wasn't informed and the debate was less about the facts
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and more about the ideologies of the Waukesha County Republicans and Milwaukee
mayor John Norquist. Unfortunately, the KRM would be hampered with the falsehoods
touted by the opposition, a backlash that proponents didn't see coming. Perhaps the
strategy difference only worked to a limited extent, as the same debates about rail came
back to the surface.
The earlier debate on light rail in Milwaukee had a profound influence on the
KRM proposal but not necessarily in the way I had initially thought. The KRM commuter
rail proposal might have actually been helped by the earlier light rail debate in terms of
having support as a better transit alternative and also being approached in a more
grassroots way. While the transportation planner I spoke with didn't see the two as
necessarily related and the transit advocate mainly saw a difference in the approaches of
the proposals, there are still some important links between the proposals. The two
proposals took place at different times, served different corridors and provided different
services, but they are linked to the broader context of passenger rail in Wisconsin that has
a history of divisiveness. Both were victims of decisions by Republican leaders, and both
were discussed in terms of the creation of an RTA. Additionally, both had the constraints
of political polarization, contrasting lifestyles, and regional feuds about transit funding.
And even though this legacy still followed the KRM, my analysis showed that the KRM
was able to still move forward despite these obstacles. While the legacy of the light rail
debate is still prominent, it appears that KRM was able to overcome the hurdles faced by
light rail. And I argue that KRM could have moved forward despite (and possibly
because of) the legacy light rail left behind.
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Conclusion
In the end, I conclude that while one specific legislative action on the part of a
Republican-dominated legislature may have officially killed the proposal (or put it on
hold indefinitely as two of my interviewees suggested) - this action was simply one event
in a broader political debate about KRM and its funding and expectations. This is not to
discount the influence of an auto-dominated culture, or the legacy of the light rail debate;
but as my analysis showed, the proposal could have (and most likely would have) moved
forward despite these issues.
KRM found itself within the economic context of a political shift that took place
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, and the broader local debate about funding for
KRM and local bus systems. In addition, the highly touted economic development
forecasts were questioned and left opponents to challenge the viability of KRM.
Representative Robin Vos became a vocal opponent of the proposal, which as some
argued was a product of the inclusion of western Racine County in the funding scope of
SERTA (and KRM). However, the largest obstacle to the KRM proposal was the veto by
Governor Doyle of the RTA compromise that would have let KRM move forward and
provided dedicated funding for local buses. The expectation of a fully regional solution
on the part of the Governor, I argue, was more than southeast Wisconsin was capable of,
given the ideological division of the past. The KRM also entered into the Republican
gubernatorial primary where opposition to the KRM became a conservative campaigning
requirement and then came to the forefront of the 2010 gubernatorial race. But by this
time, KRM was already "on life support" and the final nail in the coffin came after Scott
Walker took office with the legislature dissolving the state's RTAs.
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So while the legislature’s decision to dissolve all the state's RTAs is seen as the
official demise of KRM, I argue that earlier political moves on the part of politicians on
both sides of the aisle put the future of KRM in question. It was the decision of the
Milwaukee County Board to insist on the inclusion of western Racine County in the
funding scope of the RTA and Doyle's expectation of what the funding mechanisms and
structure of an RTA should look like (as opposed to what is feasible in the local context),
that was flawed. It was not divisive or partisan politics that killed the KRM, but politics
that did not consider compromise.
Lessons Learned
This research led me to three important issues from the KRM proposal's failure
that could provide lessons learned for future passenger rail proposals: the importance of
how the proposal is framed, the influence of individual actors, and that politics isn't
necessarily partisan.
The KRM commuter rail proposal was framed as an economic development
driver and as the solution to the mobility issues of southeast Wisconsin. The 1997
economic impact report boasted of job creation, expanded tourism, increased property
values, and increased economic development from the KRM, but these claims were
refuted by conservative researchers. As argued by the policy analyst I interviewed, the
economic claims seen in the report and heralded by proponents may have actually led the
KRM to be put under deeper scrutiny by conservatives and anti-rail groups. Along with
this is the way KRM was framed as the key to solving the mobility issues of the region.
However, soon support from Republicans and Democrats alike began to wane as low
ridership figures of 1.7 million annual riders were discussed and as many officials,
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especially in Milwaukee, feared that local bus systems would end up suffering if KRM
was to move forward. The lesson learned here for future passenger rail proposals is the
importance of how the proposal is framed. In the case of KRM, the way it was framed put
the project under deeper scrutiny and factored into the failure of the KRM proposal.
Another lesson learned from KRM was the influence of individual actors. While
KRM is not necessarily unique in how individual actors influenced the progress of the
proposal, it does highlight the large number of competing individual agendas that all
worked in different ways and in varying degrees to kill the KRM proposal. Robin Vos,
while never showing support for the KRM, didn't initially publically oppose the proposal.
Then as a product of the changing political tide, he became one of the most vocal
opponents of KRM. Scott Walker initially supported KRM because of the possibility of
forming an RTA, but changed his stance as the political tide shifted, but also likely
because of his shift from a Republican leader in a Democratic County to running for
state-wide office. Members of the Milwaukee County Board such as Michael Mayo and
Lee Holloway, along with Representative Gwen Moore and Mayor Tom Barrett, were
concerned about what KRM would mean for the already struggling MCTS. However,
most important to this discussion is Governor Jim Doyle who vetoed the RTA
compromise that came out of the legislature, citing his desire for a more regional
solution. And while his desire for a more regional solution had its merits, the expectation
for the type of regional transit authority that he wanted was a decisive moment in the fate
of the KRM proposal. The lesson to be learned here is that, when you look at why the
proposal failed, you get a closer view of the individual actors involved and how their
competing agendas stopped the proposal from moving forward.

72

Finally, one of the most interesting lessons to be learned from the KRM
proposal's failure is that the politics surrounding the proposal was not necessarily
partisan. While there was ideological polarization attached to the politics of KRM, it
seemed to be more about local issues and personal political agenda's than Republican
versus Democrat. There were several Democrats in Milwaukee, a traditional Democratic
stronghold, who had their reservations about the KRM, such as Representative Gwen
Moore, Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett, and members of the Milwaukee County Board.
These Milwaukee leaders were concerned over funding for MCTS but also if KRM was
in the best interest of Milwaukee and its residents. Democratic Governor Jim Doyle,
while supportive of KRM, seemed more concerned with his vision of the structure of an
RTA than with the repercussions that his veto on the RTA compromise would have on
the future of KRM. So while it would be easy to blame the fate of the KRM proposal on
Republican law-makers and partisan politics, the evidence shows that the failure of KRM
is more a product of competing political agendas and divisions over local issues than it
was about partisan politics. The lesson learned here is that politics is not always partisan,
and in the case of KRM became much more about competing individual interests and
agenda's than Republican versus Democrat, or conservative versus liberal.
Further Research
While I feel my interviews with three key stakeholders in the proposal, and a
thorough analysis of archival and newspaper sources was sufficient to answer the
research questions I set out to answer, further research into the KRM proposal could and
should be completed to look at a wider range of issues attached to the proposal. This
could include interviews or surveys of transit riders who depend on transit and how this
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proposal would have affected them, or interviews or surveys of potential riders of the
KRM and their feelings on the proposal. In addition, talking to the business community,
such as SC Johnson and other businesses in the corridor, and getting their perspective on
KRM and how it would have benefitted them, would be helpful. Additionally, I did not
explore the influence of factors such as race, ethnicity or poverty; or the reason(s) why
this corridor was chosen. Finally, I am hopeful that scholars from a variety of disciplines
will continue to study the failure of passenger rail proposals to understand why they
failed and how future proposals can be approached.
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Appendix
Interview Questions:
1. In your opinion, why did the KRM Commuter Rail project ultimately fail?
2. [Depending on answer to Q1] It seems, at least on the surface, that the reason for
KRM failing was largely politics. Do you feel this is accurate? Why/why not?
3. [Depending on answer to Q1] In your opinion, why has Milwaukee struggled with
funding for transit not only in the KRM project, but in other projects such as Light
Rail?
a. Was funding really the issue, or was this just the easiest way for opponents
to reject the project.
4. [Depending on answer to Q1] Do you feel that the expectations for KRM may
have been too high, and that this is part of the reason for its failure?
a. Were the economic development claims overstated?
b. Was there also a feeling amongst transit advocates that this project was the
last hope for a large-scale passenger rail project in the Milwaukee area?
5. [Depending on answer to Q1] What was the impact of the previous light-rail
debate on the KRM?
a. Do you feel the light-rail debate influenced the decision to shift focus to
Kenosha, Racine and Chicago for potential transit projects?
b. Did the light rail debate set up KRM to fail?
6. [Depending on answer to Q1] Do you feel there is a connection between the
failure of transit projects in Milwaukee (and Wisconsin) and the auto-dominated
culture that we live in?
If so, to what extent?

